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INTRODUCTION
In the early hours of 5 July 1943, German forces of Army
Group Center and Army Group South launched 'Operation
Citadel' against the Soviet forces in the Kursk bulge. The
German attack set in motion a Soviet plan to drive Axis
forces from the Eastern Ukraine. The Soviet High Command
(STAVKA) intended to bleed the Germans white at Kursk and
then, when the Germans were most vulnerable, to launch a
series of counter-strikes along the entire front from
Velikiye Luki in the north to Taganrog in the south. The
Soviet Army intended to accomplish two important objectives;
first, to clear the Eastern Ukraine of Axis forces, and
second, to establish firm bridgeheads on the west bank of the
Dnieper River.
This study of Soviet operations during the summer and
autumn of 1943 seeks to illustrate the importance of an
otherwise neglected campaign. Whereas the Battle of Kursk
receives significant attention, the ensuing Soviet offensive
has in most cases been neglected in the west. In Major
General von Mellenthin's Panzer Battles , the Soviet
operations against Orel and Kharkov are all but ignored. *
Von Mellenthin emphasizes that the German forces won
repeatedly on the tactical level but had to retreat because
of the Soviet superiority in men and materials. In Lost
Victories Field Marshal von Manstein claims that victory was
within his grasp at Kursk. If only Adolf Hitler had allowed
him to continue the offensive, the Soviet reserves would have
run out and victory would have been achieved. 2 The view that
only overwhelming superiority in men and materials combined
with interference from Hitler defeated the superior German
forces is far from accurate. It not only distorts history
and negates the important accomplishments of the Soviet
military during World War II, it demonstrates the failure of
the German High Command to grasp the significance of
operational art.
In contrast to the German view of the battle and the
subseguent campaign, Soviet historians are less concerned
with tactics. They view the 1943 summer - autumn campaign as
an operational problem. Whereas the Germans were concerned
with the next tactical victory, the Soviets were looking at
the bigger operational picture and planning their next move.
Unlike von Manstein, Marshal Zhukov in his memoirs, Zhukov'
s
Greatest Battles
, spends very little time on tactics. 3 His
primary concern was coordination of fronts, the concentration
of forces, and preparations for the counterof fensive. The
Soviet High Command was prepared for a long struggle,
successive thrusts aimed at defeating the German forces in
depth. These contrasting interpretations are central to
understanding the German defeat and more importantly the
Soviet way of war.
The 1943 summer - autumn campaign culminated in a
decisive Soviet victory. For the first time during the war
the Soviet Army waged a series of successful operations
during the summer campaign season. The campaign lasted over
five months, involved eight separate military fronts, and
took place along a two thousand kilometer front. Soviet
forces advanced 300 to 600 kilometers. By December 1943 the
Soviet military had gained the initiative which it would
never relinquish. 4 To grasp the significance of the Soviet
campaign, it is important to have an understanding of the
forces involved, both German and Soviet, their organization,
and military theory.
The 1943 campaign represented an important transition
period between the Soviet Army of 1941-1942 and the army of
1944-1945. The Red Army up to 1943 had many problems which
reduced its ability to apply Soviet operational art which had
been developed prior to World War II. The 1941-1942 army
lacked sufficient artillery, armored vehicles, and aircraft.
Owing to large losses in 1941 adequate numbers of trained
officers, noncommissioned officers and enlisted men were in
short supply. The support forces, engineers, signal units
and supply services, were also inadequate to meet operational
needs. The Soviet Army of 1941-1942 could not effectively
conduct deep offensive operations. By 1943 the supply of
trained officers and modern equipment enabled the Red Army to
contemplate the implementation of their offensive doctrine.
The increased production of equipment allowed the Soviets to
mass artillery, armor and aircraft and create specialized
armor and mechanized units. A growing supply of trained
officers with up to two years of combat experience permitted
the expansion of the support services. Nineteen Forty-three
marked the transition between the bleak days of 1941-1942 and
the victorious days of 1944-1945.
'
The 1943 campaign demonstrated the growing maturity and
skill of the Soviet military. The coordination of eight
separate military fronts, numerous successive operations, the
ability to maintain a rapid pursuit of the enemy, the
crossing of numerous major rivers while on the march, an
airborne assault in the Bukrin Bend, and the successful
redeployment of armored forces to the Lutezh Bridgehead all
demonstrated the growing technical skill of the Soviet
military forces. The Soviet front and army commanders were
not always successful, but for the first time they were
strong enough to experiment and perfect the Soviet way of
war. Sheer strength did not defeat the German forces in
1943. The professionalization and experience of the Soviet
forces played a decisive role.
The author has made extensive use of Soviet official
histories of the campaign. Many of the articles appeared in
Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal [Military History Journal].
Marshals G.K. Zhukov, A.M. Vasilevsky, and N.N. Voronov as
well as many front and army commanders have written memoirs
o
and articles. The Soviet sources fall into two general
areas, general accounts of the campaign, usually on the
operational level, and studies concerning specific aspects of
military art during the war. The Soviet sources detail the
development of various military branches and services as well
as the problems associated with offensive operations.
Western sources, primarily German memoirs and American
military studies of the war in the east, usually deal with
tactical matters. 9 Taken together, Soviet and Western
sources, illustrate the complexity of warfare on the Eastern
Front, as well as the innovative Soviet approach toward the
art of war.
CHAPTER I
SOVIET PREPARATIONS FOR THE
1943 SUMMER CAMPAIGN
As winter turned to spring in 1943, the situation on the
southern sectors of the Eastern Front stabilized. Field
Marshal von Manstein's counterof tensive halted the Soviet
advance, regained Kharkov, and reestablished a continuous
front in the east. With the coming of the spring rains and
the muddy season a relative calm settled over the front
lines. The Soviet High Command (STAVKA) set out during this
pause to determine the German plan of action for the upcoming
campaign season. In preparation for the coming summer
campaign, the High Command began rebuilding its strategic
reserve. On 1 March 1943, there were only four such reserve
armies, the 24th, 62nd, 66th, and 2nd. By the first of April
STAVKA had set in motion the creation of ten armies, the
24th, 46th, 53rd, 57th, 66th, 6th Guards, 2nd Reserve, 3rd
Reserve, 1st Tank, and 5th Guards Tank Armies.
The High Command agreed with the intelligence assessment
of the Main Intelligence Administrative of the General Staff
that the Kursk salient presented the best opportunity for the
Germans to initiate offensive operations. After analyzing
all available intelligence sources such as aerial
reconnaissance photos, partisan information, prisoner
interrogation reports, and information from the Lucy spy ring
in Switzerland, STAVKA determined that any German offensive
planned for the summer would begin in the Kursk area. From
the Kursk salient the Germans could outflank Moscow from the
south with a deep penetration or they could turn southward
into the Caucasus for a second time. STAVKA then had to
agree on a plan of action to counter the anticipated German
attack. On April 8th Marshal G. Zhukov, STAVKA
representative for the Central Front, informed Joseph Stalin
that he did not recommend a preemptive strike by Soviet
forces. 12 Zhukov suggested wearing down the German assault
units on the Soviet defenses and then, after destroying the
German tanks and reserves, a massive counterof fensive could
be launched. Stalin decided to convene a special conference
and asked the front commanders to supply estimates of the
strategic situation and possible responses. 1 ^
The conference took place in Moscow on April 12th with
Marshal Vasilevsky, Marshal Zhukov, First Deputy Chief of the
General Staff and Chief of Operations of the General Staff A.
I. Antonov, and Joseph Stalin in attendance. The majority of
the front commanders expressed confidence that the Germans
would launch a summer offensive in the Kursk area. They
recommended taking a deliberately defensive posture. Only
the Central Front command, General Vatutin and his staff,
felt that a preemptive strike was necessary. They felt that
a combined attack by the Central, Bryansk, and West Fronts
against the Orel salient was necessary to upset the German
plans and to prevent the German use of the vital Bryansk rail
junction. STAVKA decided that the Soviet forces would not
risk a preemptive attack, a similiar operation had failed
miserably in the spring of 1942, but would dig in and await
the German move. After the Germans had committed themselves
to the offensive, Soviet forces would launch an offensive of
their own north and south of Kursk bulge. The adoption of a
deliberately defensive policy by STAVKA led to a massive
program of fortification along the entire front in the Kursk
- Belgorod area. To provide rapid reinforcement of the
defending forces STAVKA reserves were positioned east of
Kursk where they could be committed for offensive or
defensive use. After establishing the basic strategy for the
upcoming summer campaign, Marshals Zhukov and Vasilevsky
returned to the theater of operations to work out the
details 14
These details included the reinforcement of front line
units and the stockpiling of supplies, the fortification of
the entire area around Kursk and Belgorod, increased air
operations against enemy aviation and supply networks, and
plans for increased partisan activity. The reinforcement of
the Central and Voronezh Front increased throughout the
spring of 1943. The armies were brought up to strength and
MAP I
The Eastern Front, July 1943
Source: The Soviet Juggernaut
, p. 22.
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additional support units were assigned. Extra artillery,
mortars, and antitank units were added. To improve command
and control, the rifle corps organization was reintroduced
where possible and signal units were added. STAVKA organized
artillery brigades, divisions, and corps to provide extra
firepower in the decisive sectors. The combined-arms armies
were reinforced by the formation of eighteen heavy tank
regiments. 15 By the first of July the Central and Voronezh
Fronts had 1,337,166 men, 3,356 armored vehicles and 19,306
guns and mortars ready to meet the German attack. Against
this force the Germans massed nearly 900,000 men, 2,700
17
armored vehicles, and 10,000 guns and mortars.
As the units of the Central and Voronezh Fronts awaited
the Germans, they dug in. The defenses consisted of six
zones arranged to a depth of 250-300 kilometers. The first
zone was five to seven kilometers deep and contained three
parallel defensive positions. Each of the positions had four
to five trenches connected by communications trenches.
Nearly 6,000 kilometers of trenches were dug on the Central
1
8
and Voronezh Fronts. Within the defensive positions were
numerous antitank strongpoints . The strongpoints occupied
key areas and usually consisted of a 76mm antitank gun
battery, 9-12 antitank rifles, 2-4 mortars, a combat engineer
1 Q
platoon, and a section of submachine gunners. To
strengthen the defenses further, nearly a million antitank
11
and antipersonnel mines were laid and 700 kilometers of wire
entanglements were constructed. The mine density reached
1,700 antitank and 1,500 antipersonnel mines per kilometer of
20front. By the first of July the Soviet defenses were some
of the strongest ever seen.
During May and June the Soviet Air Force launched two
major air operations against the German Luftwaffe and supply
organization. From May 6th to May 8th aircraft of the 1st,
15th, 16th, 2nd, 17th, and 8th Air Armies attacked German
airfields. According to Soviet sources, 506 enemy aircraft
were destroyed. 1 Between May 5th and May 15th the six air
armies flew a total of 10,300 sorties against enemy
airfields, railways, and roads. 22 The air offensive was
repeated from June 8th to 10th. A further 259 German
aircraft were claimed as destroyed as well as numerous trains
2 3and motor vehicles. The air operations had the dual
purpose of reducing the number of German aircraft available
for the upcoming offensive and also weakened the German
transportation network to a depth of 200-250 kilometers. 24
STAVKA gave the partisan detachments the critical task
of disrupting the enemy force behind the lines. The
partisans were supplied with demolitions experts, explosives
and other equipment. Prior to the German attack the
partisans gathered intelligence and destroyed vital railways
and communications networks in the German rear areas around
Kharkov, Orel, and Bryansk.
12
While the Central and Voronezh Fronts prepared for the
expected German offensive, STAVKA began planning its
counterof fensive . The counterof fensive consisted of several
operations. Operation Kutuzov had as its object the
liberation of Orel and the elimination of the Orel bulge. An
offensive against the Orel Bulge would prevent the transfer
of German forces to the south and put pressure on the hinge
between Army Group South and Army Group Center. A
breakthrough in the Bryansk area would threaten the northern
flank of Army Group South and aid the Soviet attack to the
south. Operation Rumyantsev called for the liberation of
Kharkov and the elimination of the German forces in that
area. If successful the two operations, Kutuzov and
Rumyantsev
,
would then be expanded. After clearing Kharkov
the offensive would continue southwest toward the Dnieper.
The troops were to cross and gain a line Kherson-Krivoi
Rog-Kremenchug. The main goals of the Soviet summer
offensive were to eliminate German troops in the Eastern
Ukraine, establish bridgeheads on the west bank of the
Dnieper, and by doing so breach the German "East Wall" and
liberate the Eastern Ukraine and Donbas Region.
The Eastern Ukraine, Donbas region, and the Dnieper
River were all of very important economic and military value.
Unfortunately for the Soviet forces each of the three regions
favored the defender. The Eastern Ukraine was important for
13
several reasons. The northern portion produced large
quantities of grain, the liberation of this area would
greatly improve the food situation in the Soviet Union. The
southern section contained the manufacturing and
mineral-producing Donbas region. The Donbas area contained
the important cities of Stalino, Voroshilovgrad, Mariupol,
Dnepropetrovsk and Melitopol. Mineral resources included
coal in the Stalino area, nickel in the Nikopol area, and
iron ore and manganese around Krivoi Rog. The nickel and
manganese were vital to war production; and as Hitler
ordered, the Germans fought stubbornly to retain control of
25
the mines as long as possible.
The numerous rivers in the Eastern Ukraine presented the
Soviet Army with a number of maneuver problems. The largest
river, the Dnieper, and its tributaries generally ran north
to south and thus perpendicular to the line of advance. The
Germans defended each river barrier as they fell back thus
forcing the Soviets to assault each river line in turn. The
Dnieper River, the keystone of the "East Wall," is the third
longest river in Europe, over 2200 kilometers long, and has
seven major tributaries, five of which flow into the Dnieper
from the east. The Sozh, Desna, Sula, Psel, and Vorskla run
in a general north to south direction. After fighting across
the tributaries the Soviet forces had to cross the Dnieper
itself which presented many problems. The right bank of the
14
Dnieper is rugged with a higher elevation then the left bank.
The German defenders on the right bank could fire down upon
the Soviet troops as they approached. The Dnieper is also
wide, up to 2000 yards at Dnepropetrovsk. 26 The few bridges
over the river were in the cities of Kiev, Kanev, Kremenchug,
Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozhe, and Kherson. The geography of the
Eastern Ukraine played an important role in the 1943
campaign. The Soviet forces had to overcome a large number
of barriers inorder to defeat the German forces.
CHAPTER II
SOVIET MILITARY ORGANIZATION
The Soviet High Command (STAVKA) led by Joseph Stalin
controlled the Soviet military. Through the use of its
representatives, STAVKA maintained close contact with the
various front commands. During the spring and summer of 1943
Marshal Georgi Zhukov and Marshal Aleksandr Vasilevsky
coordinated the activities of the Central and Voronezh Fronts
while Marshal Nikolai Voronov aided the West and Kalinin
Fronts. These men were moved about as needed. A Soviet
front, the equivalent of a German army group, controlled a
number of armies as well as independent divisions, corps, and
support units. During the Soviet summer offensive no fewer
then eight fronts participated in the drive to the Dnieper.
At the beginning of July 1943 the fronts were organized as
follows.
The Kalinin Front, commanded by General A.I. Yeremenko,
covered a 360 kilometer sector north and northeast of
Smolensk. Yeremenko, a graduate of the Frunze Military
Academy, held several front commands and was wounded twice
during 1941-1942. He commanded the Stalingrad and later the
Southeastern Front in late 1942. 27 The Kalinin Front
contained the 3rd Shock, 4th Shock, 39th, 43rd, and 3rd Air
2 8Armies.
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The West Front, commanded by General V.D. Sokolovsky,
extended nearly 300 kilometers from the Belev area on the
left to the Yartsevo area on the right. The left flank of the
West Front covered the northern side of the Orel bulge. A
graduate of the Academy of the General Staff, Sokolovsky
served as Chief of Staff for the Western Front during the
period 1941-1943 before taking command in the spring of 1943.
Sokolovsky' s front contained the 50th, 31st, 10th, 49th,
33rd, 21st, 68th, 5th, 10th Guards, 11th Guards, and the 1st
Air Armies. The 11th and 4th Tank Armies of STAVKA reserve
were positioned behind the West Front.
The Bryansk Front, commanded by General M.M. Popov,
extended 150 kilometers along the eastern edge of the Orel
bulge from Belev to Novosil. Popov, a graduate of the Frunze
Military Academy, began the war commanding the Leningrad
Military District. After commanding the Northern and
Leningrad Fronts he served as deputy commander for the
Stalingrad and Southwestern Fronts. Popov controlled the
61st, 3rd, 63rd, and 15th Air Armies. Two STAVKA reserve
armies, the 3rd Guards Tank and 4th Guards, were positioned
behind the Bryansk Front. On July 10th Popov had 24 infantry
divisions, 433,616 men, 952 tanks, 135 assault guns, 7642
guns and mortars, and 160 multiple rocket launchers. 29
The Central Front, commanded by Marshal K. K.
Rokossovsky. extended 300 kilometers along the northern and
17
eastern faces of the Kursk bulge with the Bryansk Front to
the north and the Voronezh Front to the South. Marshal
Rokossovsky, a graduate of the Frunze Military Academy, was
imprisioned during the 1930 's during the purge of the Red
Army. He survived to commanded various armies and mechanized
formations early in the war. Before taking command of the
Central Front he commanded the Bryansk and Don Fronts. The
Central Front contained the 48th, 13th, 70th, 65th, 60th and
16th Air Armies with the 2nd Tank Army in reserve.
Rokossovsky also had the 19th and 9th independent Tanks
Corps. On the 1st of July Rokossovsky ' s force consisted of
41 rifle divisions, 711,575 men, 1,694 tanks, 91 assault
guns, 11,076 guns and mortars, and 246 rocket launchers.
The Voronezh Front, commanded by General N. Vatutin,
held the southwestern and southern sector of the Kursk Bulge.
Vatutin, a graduate of the Frunze Military Academy, served as
head of the Operations Department of the Soviet General Staff
in 1941. He then went on to command the Southwest and
Voronezh Fronts. To cover 240 kilometers of front Vatutin
had the 38th, 40th, 6th Guards, 7th Guards, 69th, 1st Tank,
and the 2nd Air Armies. In reserve Vatutin had the 5th
Guards, and 2nd Guards Independent Tanks Corps. Vatutin 's
Front had 35 infantry divisions, 625,591 men, 1,662 tanks, 42
assault guns. 8718 guns and mortars, and 272 multiple rocket
launchers available at the start of German offensive.
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The Southwest Front, commanded by General R. Malinovsky,
covered a 360 kilometer sector north and south of Izyum along
the Donets River. Malinovsky, a graduate of the Frunze
Military Academy, commanded several different armies in 1941
and 1942. He did head the Southern Front for a short time
before moving to the Southwestern Front. Malinovsky had the
57th, 46th, 1st Guard, 6th, 12th, 3rd, 8th Guard, and 17th
Air Armies.
The South Front, commanded by General F. Tolbukhin, held
a 170 kilometer line along the Mius River. Tolbukhin, a
graduate of the Frunze Military Academy, commanded an army
before taking command of the Southern Front. He controlled
the 44th, 28th, 5th Shock, 51st, 2nd Guards, and 8th Air
Armies. The five armies had 28 rifle divisions and several
independent units.
The Soviet High command positioned the Steppe Front in
reserve east of Kursk. The front commander, I. S. Konev,
began the war in charge of an army but quickly gained control
of the Kalinin Front which he directed for nearly two years.
The Steppe Front contained the 47th, 27th, 53rd, 5th Guards,
5th Guards Tank, and 5th Air Armies. It also controlled the
5th, 7th, and 8th Guards Cavalry Corps, the 2nd, 10th, and
4th Guards Independent Tank Corps, and the 1st Independent
Mechanized Corps. At the beginning of July the Steppe Front
contained 537,000 men, 8,500 guns and mortars, 1,630 tanks
19
and assault guns, and 550 aircraft. This represented a very
formidable reserve positioned to counter any German move in
the Kursk area.
During the first two years of the war, the Soviet army
struggled to bring the war to the Germans. The German
invasion had quickly destroyed the Soviet capability to
execute their military doctrine. Despite their heavy losses
the army continued to launch attacks, even though they lacked
the resources and experience to conduct effective offensive
operations. Only in 1943 did the army begin to receive
sufficient equipment and weapons, and more importantly
officers and soldiers skillful enough to execute deep,
combined-arms offensive operations.
The largest standing unit in the Soviet military was the
army. There were combined arms, tank, shock, and air armies.
The combined arms army was the most common. The strength of
the combined-arms army varied according to its assigned
mission. An army participating in a main assault would have
more men and support units then one guarding a quiet sector
of the front. The combined arms army usually contained three
rifle corps and support units. Support units, rather scarce
early in the war, became more plentiful in 1943. The
addition of artillery, tank, engineer, and construction units
gave the combined arms army sufficient strength to conduct
breakthroughs against even the stiffest defenses.
20
TABLE 1. Soviet Combined-Arms Army Organization
T.O.SE. 1943/1944
3 Rifle Corps
8-12 Rifle Oiv.
4 Artillery Reg.
+ Attached Units:
Infantry Support Tanks
SP Gun Reg.
Antiaircraft Reg.
Antitank Brigades
Breakthrough Art. Div.
Support Forces
Personnel
Tanks
SP Guns
Guns/Mortars
110,000-120,000
250-400
0-250
1,500-2,500
Source: Erickson, John. "Historical Introduction: The Soviet Ground Forces,
1941-1960," in Myron Smith Jr. The Soviet Army: A Guide to Sources in
English
,
p. xxxii.
TABLE 2. Soviet Tank Army Organization
T.O.SE. 1943
2 Tank Corps Personnel 46,000 48,000
1 Mechanized Corps Tanks 450-560 450-620
2 Antitank Gun Reg. SP Guns 25 98-147
2 Mortar Reg. (MRL) Guns/Mortars 500-600 650-750
2 Antiaircraft Reg.
2 SP Gun Reg.
+ Attached units
Erickson, John. "Historical Introduction: The
1941-1960," in Myron Smith Jr. The Soviet Army:
English
,
p. xxxiii.
Soviet Ground Forces,
A Guide to Sources in
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In the spring of 1943 the rifle corps was gradually
reintroduced into the Soviet military organization. After
the German invasion, the lack of sufficient trained command
personal led to the abandonment of the rifle corps
organization. The rifle divisions were put directly under
the control of the army commanders. As the Soviet manpower
situation improved and more staff officers were trained, it
became possible to reintroduce the rifle corps. The basic
rifle corps contained anywhere from two to four rifle
divisions and support units. A rifle corps usually contained
between twenty and forty thousand men. 30
The basic unit in the Soviet army was the rifle
division. In June 1941 the Soviet infantry division was
modeled on western divisions and had a large number of
organic support units. The Table of Organization & Eguipment
(TO&E) for a prewar rifle division called for 14,418 men. 31
Following the invasion and the massive losses sustained, the
army was unable to replace the large number of skilled
personal needed to man the pre-war infantry division. By
late 1942 the infantry division contained 9,435 men with
limited organic support weapons. The only organic support
came from mortars, 82mm and 120mm, and antitank guns, 45mm
and 76mm. The infantrymen were the main strength of the
division. As the war progressed the number of submachine
guns increased dramatically, giving the Soviet infantryman
April 1941 14,483 32 66
July 10,859 8 24
December 11,626 8 108
March 1942 12,795 12 94
July 10,386 12 103
December 9,435 12 104
July 1943 9,380 12 104
December 1944 11,706 12 104
22
increased firepower. The strength of the rifle divisions
crept upward as the Soviet manpower situation improved.
TABLE 3. Soviet Rifle Division TO&E12 3
Personnel Artillery Mortars Antitank Guns
73
40
40
56
76
82
82
86
All guns and Howitzers larger then 76mm.
82mm and 120mm Mortars
37mm, 45mm, and 76mm guns
Erickson, John. "Historical Introduction: The Soviet Ground Forces,
1941-1960," in Myron Smith Jr. The Soviet Army: A Guide to Sources in
English
, p. xxxii.: War in the East: The Russo-German Conflict, 1941-1945 ,
p. 117.
The existence of tank armies illustrated the improved
equipment and personnel situation in the spring of 1943.
After the terrible losses of both equipment and officers
familiar with mechanized operations in 1941, the formation of
large tank units became impractical. The Soviets were unable
to command effectively or control large complicated units
when the war began. In 1942 the increased production of
tanks and assault guns made it possible to form tank corps
and eventually tank armies. The reorganization of the tank
army's component units simplified command sufficiently to
ensure adequate control. The Soviet tank army, the
2 3
equivalent of a German Panzer corps, usually consisted of two
tank corps, a mechanized corps, and support units. Support
consisted of engineers, artillery, heavy tanks units, and
supply services.
The Soviet tank corps was the main offensive weapon of
the Soviet army. Although designated a corps, the units were
actually more like divisions. The tank corps usually
contained three tank brigades, an infantry brigade, and
support units. The tank corps' one weakness was a lack of
infantry which limited the units staying power when heavily
engaged.
TABLE 4. Soviet Tank Corps TO&E
1942 1943 1944
Personnel 7,800 10 ,977 12,010
Arti 1 lery/Mortars 90 90 158
MRL 8 8 8
Tanks
Light 70 — —
Medium 90 208 20
'
Heavy 8 — —
SP Guns — 49 63
AFV (Total) 168 257 270
Source: Zaloga, Steven J. and James Grandsen. Soviet Tanks and Combat Vehicles of
World War Two
,
p. 222-223.: Krupchenko, 1. "Wartime Employment of Tank
Troops Described: Translated from Voyenno Istoricheskiy Zhurnal
,
September
1979," p. 56.
The Soviet mechanized corps were some of the largest
units in the Soviet army. The 1940 TO&E called for 37,000
men, 1,031 tanks, 268 armored cars, 358 guns and mortars, and
24
5,000 motor vehicles. 32 The corps were very quickly
destroyed in the first months of the war for several reasons.
The Mechanized corps were to large for the average Soviet
corps commander and his staff to control effectively, the
troops were poorly trained, and the equipment was in poor
mechanical condition. JJ
TABLE 5. Soviet Mechanized Corps TO&E
1942 1943 1944
Personnel
Guns
Mortars
MRL
Tanks
Light
Medium
Heavy
SP Guns
AFV (Total)
Source: Zaloga, Steven J. and James Grandsen. Soviet Tanks and Combat Vehicles
of
World Mar Two, p. 222-223.: John Erickson. "Historical Introduction: The
Soviet Ground Forces, 1941-1960," in Myron Smith Jr. The Soviet Army, A Guide
to Sources in English , p. xxix.
When the increased production of armored vehicles
allowed the reformation of the mechanized corps in the summer
and fall of 1942, the High Command attempted to correct the
major weakness of the old organization. They reduced the
size of the corps. The mechanized corps consisted of three
mechanized brigades, a tank brigade, and support units. With
a TO&E strength of 13,-559 officers and men, the mechanized
13,559 15 ,018 16 ,442
36 36 80
54 72 154
8 8 8
75 42 --
100 162 183
--
--
--
175
25
229
63
246
25
corps was less then half the size of its pre-war predecessor.
Despite the reduction in strength the mechanized corps was
still the largest division sized formation in the Soviet
army. Its main advantage was its staying power in combat.
The mechanized corps was the equivalent of a German
Panzergrenadier division.
Table 6. Soviet Artillery Unit TO&E
Subunits Weapons
Artillery
Breakthrough Corps 2-3 Artillery Breakthrough 524-1200 guns/
and Mortar Divisions mortars/rockets
Artillery
Breakthrough Division Mortar Brigade 264-400
3 regiments (108x120mm) guns/mortars/
Light Artillery Brigade rockets
Consisted of several 2-3 regiments (48-72x76mm)
Brigades, usually Howitzer Brigade
4-6. 2 regiments (76x122mm)
Heavy Howitzer Brigade
4 Battalions (32x150mm)
Guards Mortar Brigade
3 Regiments (72x132mm MRL)
Antitank Brigade 3 Antitank Regiment (72x76mm) 72 AT guns
Source: War in the East: The Russo-German Conflict, 1941-1945 , p. 123.
The German invasion led to the centralization of
artillery within the Soviet army. The artillery strength of
34
the rifle division was reduced to one regiment, 24 guns.
The remaining artillery was grouped into regiments, brigades,
and later divisions. The massing of artillery made possible
the development of the artillery offensive. By concentrating
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up to three hundred guns and mortars per kilometer of front,
the Soviets were able to neutralize German defense's and
achieve major breakthroughs. As more guns and mortars became
available, Breakthrough Artillery Corps were formed.
Aviation assets were controlled by the air army. Each
front usually had an air army attached to provide necessary
air support. By 1943 their average strength was from 550 to
1,000 aircraft. The air army made it possible to execute the
air offensive by massing the available aircraft to provide
close support for the ground forces. Centralized command
maximized the use of limited resources. Within any
particular air army the number of attack aircraft ranged from
thirty to fifty percent of the total aircraft available.
The mass production of the IL-2 (Sturmovik) ground attack
aircraft greatly strengthened the air army's ground support
capability. The air army played an integral role in
offensive operations.
CHAPTER III
SOVIET MILITARY ART
By the summer of 1943 Soviet operational art had
undergone many important refinements. The basic principles
of Soviet operational art were: 1. Mobility and high rates of
combat operations; 2. Concentration; 3. Surprise; 4.
Combat activeness; 5. Preservation of combat effectiveness;
6. Conformity of goal and plan to actual situation; 7.
coordination. ^ These principles were at the heart of Soviet
planning and organization. The successful application of
these principles enabled the Soviet military to implement its
doctrine of successive operations, deep operations, and
3 8
combined-arms warfare. The main objective of the military
doctrine was to defeat the enemy throughout his entire
position. Only offensive operations could achieve that
objective. The 'offensive' typified the Soviet way of war.
The entire Soviet force structure was designed with one thing
in mind, breakthrough and exploitation.
Soviet offensive operations stressed speed,
concentration, and cooperation. The Soviet army used a
system of echeloning to maintain the speed of their advances.
Each unit in the army from the front down to division was
normally divided into several echelons. In offensive
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operations the first echelon had the responsibility of
achieving the initial breakthrough while the second echelon,
usually consisting of tank, mechanized, and cavalry units,
exploited any gains made by the first echelon. This use of
echeloning made it possible to maintain the momentum of
offensive operations. If the first echelon bogged down, the
second could join the battle and push ahead.
Concentration— the massing of armored vehicles, artillery,
and men on a narrow breakthrough frontage— insured local
superiority.
TABLE 7. Echelons and Concentration
C. Massing of fo<
80-120
NPP ianks-20-30
on oer 1.6-0 7 ki
w Correlation of men andweapons on break ihrougfi
In Battalions -
5-10:1
In guns& mortars -
6-12:1
In tanks and SAU -
4-10:1
1. Second Echelon of Front
2. Mobile Front Reserve
3. Second Echelon of Army
4. Second Echelon of Rifle Corps
5. Mobile Army Group
6. Second Echelon of Rifle Division
7. Subgroup of the Army Artillery Group
8. Divisional Artillery Group
9. Tanks for Direct Infantry support
Source: The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics
, p. 204.
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The most important element of the breakthrough force was
the infantry. In the end the infantryman had the difficult
task of dislodging the enemy from his defensive positions.
The success of the infantry depended on the support he
received from the artillery, tank units, aviation, and other
auxiliary forces. The need for effective support became more
important as the war progressed because, as the Germans lost
the strategic initiative, they assumed a more defensive
posture. Whereas in 1941 and 1942 the Germans had relied on
a point defense, hedgehogs built around cities and town, they
began defending in depth in 1943. The Germans tried to
establish two defense zones with several positions in each
zone. When given time, the German lines were well fortified
with good fields of fire, trenches, obstacles, and bunkers.
Only the cooperation of all the Soviet military forces
ensured the success of a breakthrough operation.
"
Soviet breakthrough operations were usually launched
against the linking point between two German units. They
preferred to attack between two German corps or armies. This
increased the confusion on the German side. The main goals
of the breakthrough operation were to destroy the enemy units
in the Soviet zone of attack, open the enemy flanks, and then
exploit the opening. The breakthrough forces were to: 1.
destroy the entire tactical depth of the enemy positions from
front to rear; 2. penetrate the German positions with a
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combined arms force of infantry, tanks, and mechanized
forces; 3. break up the German units into small isolated
groups; and 4. eliminate any garrisons holding out in the
breakthrough area. A successful breakthrough operation
required much planning and preparation.
Breakthrough operations were usually preceded by a
reconnaissance in force. In 1941-1942 a reinforced company
usually undertook the task, but by 1943 there were usually
sufficient forces to send in reinforced battalions. The
reconnaissance would provide intelligence concerning the
enemy's final dispositions and weak spots. The breakthrough
operation proper would begin with an intense artillery and
air bombardment designed to eliminate enemy strongpoints and
artillery. By 1943 anywhere from two to three hundred guns
and mortars per kilometer of breakthrough frontage shelled
the enemy forward positions. At the same time several
hundred aircraft would hit the German positions. The depth
of destruction of the artillery and air preparation increased
from 1.5 to 2.5 kilometers in 1941-1942 to 6 to 8 kilometers
in 1944. 4 The artillery tactics changed as well during the
period. As the availability of guns and ammunition
increased, it became possible to fire single and later double
barrages against enemy positions. The effectiveness of the
supportive fire increased as a result. As the barrage
lifted, the attacking formations moved forward supported by
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infantry support tanks and assault guns. The success of the
attack depended on the tempo of the attacking units. If the
assault forces moved up to early they risked destruction by
their own artillery and if they moved up to late the Germans
had time to regain their senses and climb out of their holes.
The assault force and its supporting units were
concentrated against an ever decreasing sector of the enemy
line. At the start of the war the average division attacked
on a 7 to 14 kilometer front. By the summer of 1943 the
average attack frontage had decreased to 2-2.5 kilometers.
The decrease in frontage made it possible to achieve three to
one superiority in men and a four or five to one advantage in
tanks and artillery against the enemy in the breakthrough
sector. At the same time the attack frontage per division
was decreasing the distance the assaulting units had to cross
to reach the enemy was decreasing as well. In 1941 -1942 the
assault forces usually began the attack six to eight hundred
meters from the German positions. While the artillery
preparation was underway, the attacking units would leave
their poorly engineered positions and advance to within two
to three hundred meters of the German lines. By 1943 the
attacking forces were able to start within two to three
hundred yards of the Germans. 44 This was made possible by
better engineering of the forward positions and more support
forces. By reducing the distance from the jumpoff point to
the German lines the time under enemy fire was minimized.
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The infantry support (NPP) tanks provided immediate
cover for the advancing infantry. These tanks were attached
directly to the infantry units and were to provide close
gunfire support. The main task of the NPP was to destroy
enemy infantry with high speed maneuvering. Up to 1943 the
tanks in the infantry units had been dispersed which weakened
their combat effectiveness. By 1943 there were sufficient
tanks to mass the NPP tanks and maximize their combat power.
Against a weak defense the tanks attacked in single echelon
of two waves but against a strong dug-in defense they usually
attacked in two to three echelons with a depth of one
kilometer. The second echelon led the infantry. 45 The
support tanks operated with the infantry through the entire
first German tactical defense zone. Once the first zone was
penetrated, the tanks would sometimes be combined with
forward infantry units and sent on ahead to take the second
defense zone before the Germans firmly entrenched themselves.
Once the breakthrough was established, the second
echelon, the mechanized units, would rush through the gap and
attempt to exploit the situation. Early in the war the large
tank units had been largely destroyed without achieving any
major success. When tank corps were reestablished in the
spring of 1942, the Soviets attempted to learn from their
past mistakes. Whereas the tanks were distributed along the
entire zone of advance in 1941, they were massed for the
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offensive at Stalingrad. The exploiting tanks of the tank
and mechanized corps were massed to gain the maximum shock
power possible. The exploiting force had several important
objectives once it pushed through the German line. The most
important task was to prevent German reserves from sealing
off the breakthrough. Second, the exploiting units were to
get behind the German units holding the flanks of the
breakthrough. By threatening German units with encirclement,
they could be destroyed or forced to retreat. Either way the
breakthrough area was expanded. The last objective of the
breakthrough force was to achieve a jumping off point for the
next offensive operation. If the Germans were falling back
on a river it was important that the advance units of the
second echelon gain and hold a bridgehead when possible. A
bridgehead reduced the defensive value of a German river
line. 46
Air operations were a crucial part of the Soviet
offensive. The air offensive consisted of three phases and
involved hundreds of planes. The air offensive began with
the preparation phase. The preparation phase consisted of
the preliminary and immediate stages. The preliminary stage
began several days before the attack, usually three, and
consisted of air strikes against enemy transportation
,
communication, and front line areas. In the main
breakthrough area the bombing density sometimes reached a
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hundred tons per square kilometer. The immediate stage of
the air offensive took place anytime from ten minutes to two
hours before the attack and lasted about fifteen minutes.
The primary targets were the front line enemy positions and
reserves. The second phase consisted of air support for the
attacking units. The ground attack aircraft undertook most
of the sorties during this phase but all aircraft were used.
The aircraft attacked the enemy positions according to the
needs of the Soviet ground forces. The third phase was
accompanying air support. Undertaken by specially selected
large air units, the primary mission during this phase was to
destroy enemy operational reserves, including aircraft,
provide cover and support for the ground, units , and to fly
reconnaissance missions. The success of the air offensive
communication with the ground units was assured by the
assignment of air representatives down to division level and
the establishment of auxiliary command posts at the front.
The attacking aircraft were guided to their targets by radio
equipped observors. Colored panels and smoke were used to
designate friendly units. The first full scale use of the air
offensive was slated for the summer of 1943. 48
The airborne forces were under the direct control of
the Soviet High Command. The primary mission of airborne
forces was to disrupt enemy rear areas while other ground
units staged a breakthrough operation. The paratroopers were
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to delay German reinforcements and supplies thereby aiding
the breakthrough. The 1941 field regulations established
guidelines for the use of airborne forces. Early in the war
the airborne forces put into the line as regular infantry and
lost. During the Moscow counterof fensive, airborne forces
were dropped; but except for local tactical successes, the
operation was a failure. A breakdown in planning and
cooperation led to the loss of the units involved. After the
losses and failures of 1941 the airborne forces were
reconstituted. They saw little action until 1943. A
successful airborne operation depended on a thorough
reconnaissance of the drop zone, secrecy and surprise,
reliable transportation support, accurate calculation of the
time needed to do the job, and reliable communication within
the paratroop units and to the rear headquarters. Finally,
it was important that the various branches cooperate to
achieve the overall objective. 49
The Soviet concept of the offensive underwent relatively
little change during the war. As the war progressed the
Soviet military finally received the necessary experience and
materials to execute its military doctrine. In 1943 the
scope of Soviet operations increased dramatically. But more
important than the massive amounts of equipment was the
Soviet ability to put that equipment to work. Soviet
operational art made it all possible.
CHAPTER IV
GERMAN MILITARY PLANNING & ORGANIZATION
The German Army launched Operation Barbarossa in June
1941 with a formidable force of 151 divisions. The Germans
fielded 3,050,000 officers and enlisted men, 3,350 tanks and
assault guns, 7,184 artillery pieces and mortars, and nearly
600,000 motor vehicles. Heavy losses in the initial
campaign led to a manpower shortage in the spring of 1942.
The situation was corrected to some extent by the
introduction of large numbers of Axis allied troops. In
September 1942 the German military strength dipped to two and
a half million. The Hungarians, Rumanians, and Italians had
contributed nearly 650,000 men by the summer of 1942. The
Finns contributed around 400,000 men to the war effort in the
north. By July 1943 German strength in the East had risen
to 3.1 million men. More importantly, tank and assault gun
strength surpassed the 1941 level, increasing to 2,269 and
52997 respectively. The coming of summer, a new campaign
season, gave the German Army a renewed sense of confidence.
The German offensive. Operation Citadel, envisioned two
separate thrusts aimed at reducing the Kursk bulge from the
north and south. The offensive would encircle two Soviet
military fronts and open the way for future military
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operations. Adolf Hitler and the High Command were confident
that the combination of reinforcements, new armor and German
military skill would insure victory over the Soviet forces.
The armor reinforcements consisted of new Mark V Panther and
Mark VI Tiger tanks and the Elephant assault gun. The army
hoped that the new vehicles , with their 75mm and 88mm high
velocity guns, would prove more than a match for the Soviet
T-34 tank. Hitler's desire to have more of the new armor led
to repeated delays in starting the offensive, originally
slated for early May. The offensive did not get underway
until July 5th.
Army Group Center (AGO and Army Group South (AGS) had
the responsibility for implementing Operation Citadel. Field
Marshal von Kluge commanded AGC. Von Kluge had commanded the
4th Army through the Polish, and French campaigns. He
continued to command that army through the opening campaign
in Russia. In December 1941 he took command of AGC. 54 in
July 1943 AGC held a front extending from Velikiye Luki to
the Seim River north of Belopolye. To cover nearly a
thousand kilometers of front von Kluge had five armies.
The 3rd Panzer Army, commanded by Generaloberst
Georg-Hans Reinhardt, held the northern most sector of AGC.
Reinhardt had commanded the 4th Panzer Division during the
Polish campaign. In France and the opening campaign in
Russia, he led a motorized corps. In late 1941 he took
38
command of the 3rd Panzer Army. Comprising four corps, one
composed of luftwaffe Infantry, the army contained six
infantry, four Luftwaffe infantry, and one Panzergrenadier
division. The 3rd Panzer Army held the Velikiye Luki to
Smolensk sector.
The 4th Army, commanded by Generaloberst Gotthard
Heinrici, occupied the German line between Smolensk and
Kirov. Heinrici had commanded the 16th Infantry Division in
Poland and the XLIII Infantry Corps in 1941-1942 before
becoming commander of the 4th Army in late 1942. The army
contained five corps, two of which were designated Panzer
Corps, and had 18 infantry divisions. All of the Panzer
Divisions were transferred to 9th Army or were in Army Group
Reserve.
The 2nd Panzer Army, commanded by General der
Panzertruppen Rudolf Schmidt until July 13, 1943 and then by
General Walter Model, occupied the north and eastern sectors
of the Orel Bulge. Rudolf Schmidt had led the XXXIX Panzer
Corps during the French campaign. He commanded the corps
until December 1941 when he took over command of the 2nd
Panzer Army following the dismissal of General Heinz
Guderian. The main mission of the army's three corps and
fourteen divisions, thirteen Infantry and one
PanzerGrenadier, was to protect the rear of 9th Army as it
attacked south from the Orel Bulge toward Kursk.
39
The 9th Army, commanded by General Model, had the
difficult task of spearheading the German northern thrust
toward Kursk. Model had commanded the 3rd Panzer Division in
1941. He took over command of the 9th Army in early 1942.
Following the start of Operation Kutuzov in July 1943 he took
command of the 2nd Panzer Army in addition to the 9th Army.
For the Kursk offensive his army was reinforced and equipped
with the newest tanks and assault guns. Of its five corps
three were designated Panzer and contained four Panzer
divisions. The remainder of the army consisted of 14
infantry divisions. The 9th Army was to drive south from the
Orel Bulge, push through the Soviet defenses and link up with
the 4th Panzer Army in the area of Kursk.
The 2nd Army, commanded by General der Infanterie Walter
Weiss, held the western edge of the Kursk Bulge. Weiss had
commanded the I Infantry Corps during the French campaign and
the XXVI Corps in Russia during the winter of 1942-1943. In
May 19 43 he took command of the 2nd Army. The army's two
corps contained seven divisions and the remnants of two
others. His main task was to hold the western front of the
Kursk bulge while covering the right flank of 9th Army and
the left flank of 4th Panzer Army as they advanced toward
Kursk.
In the AGC rear Field Marshal von Kluge had a large
security force and a substantial reserve. Four Hungarian and
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three German security divisions were responsible for security
and anti-partisan duty. The reserve consisted of four
Panzer, one Panzergrenadier , and several infantry divisions.
The armored reserve was available to exploit any breakthrough
achieved by 9th Army.
Army Group South, commanded by Field Marshal von
Manstein, held the German line from the Seim River south to
the Sea of Azov. Von Manstein had served as Chief of Staff
for Army Group South during the Polish campaign. He was the
architect of the thrust through the Ardennes which led to the
fall of France. In March 1941 von Manstein took command of
the LVI Panzer Corps. During the initial campaign in the
Soviet Union he directed his Panzer Corps to the outskirts of
Leningrad. In September 1942 he took command of the 11th
Army in the Crimea. After taking Sevastopol he returned
North but Before he could defeat Leningrad in late 1942, von
Manstein became the commander of the Don Army Group. He was
instrumental in stopping the Soviet Stalingrad
counterof fensive. In the spring of 1943 after his recapture
of Kharkov von Manstein became commander of AGS. To hold
nine hundred kilometers of front, von Manstein had four
armies at his disposal, two of which where earmarked for the
Kursk offensive.
The 4th Panzer Army, commanded by Generaloberst Hermann
Hoth, consisted of three corps, two of which were Panzer.
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Hoth was one of the leading Panzer commanders in the German
army. He had led the 3rd Panzer Army in the 1941 campaign.
In 1942 his 4th Panzer Army participated in the Stalingrad
campaign. The 4th Panzer Army had five Panzer divisions,
three of which were SS divisions, the GrossDeutschland
Panzergrenadier Division, and four infantry divisions.
Fourth Panzer Army was to drive north through Oboyan to Kursk
thus linking with 9th Army and pocketing large Soviet
formations.
Army Detachment Kempf (ADK) , commanded by General der
Panzertruppen Werner Kempf, covered the right flank of 4th
Panzer Army. Kempf had commanded the 6th Panzer Division in
1940 and the XLVIII Panzer Corps from 1941 to early 1943.
Following the Soviet Stalingrad Counterof fensive Kempf took
command of an ad hoc formation which was designated Army
Detachment Kempf. ADK became the 8th Army in mid-August
1943. Containing three corps, including one Panzer Corps,
the army was to attack from its bridgehead on the eastern
bank of the Donets River and move north-northeast covering
the right flank of 4th Panzer Army as it advanced north. To
accomplish this task ADK had three Panzer and six infantry
divisions.
The 1st Panzer Army, commanded by General der Kavallerie
Eberhard von Mackensen, held the sector along the Donets
River north and south of Izyum. Von Mackensen had served as
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Chief of Staff of the 12th Array in 1940. After commanding a
Panzer corps in 1941, he became commander of the 1st Panzer
Army in late 1942. He had four corps, three of them Panzer.
One Panzer corps, held in reserve, contained three Panzer
divisions and was available for redeployment to 4th Panzer
Army or ADK if needed. The 1st Panzer Army had only nine
infantry divisions in the line along the Donets.
The re-created 6th Army, commanded by General der
Infanterie Karl Hollidt, held the southernmost sector of AGS.
He had commanded the XXVII Corps from 1942 to early 1943 when
he took over command of the 6th Army. Dug in along the Mius
River, 6th Army had three corps with seven infantry, one
mountain, one Luftwaffe infantry, and one Panzergrenadier
division along with an infantry Kampfgruppe. Its primary
task was to protect the right flank of AGS while holding on
to the important Donbas region with its mineral resources.
In the area of military organization the summer of 1943
was a period of transition for the German army. Two years of
heavy fighting had put an immense strain on the German
manpower pool and thus led to a serious shortage of soldiers
for the Eastern Front. The army attempted to correct the
deficit in two ways. First, they squeezed surplus manpower
from their economy. This provided enough men in the spring
of 1943 to stabilize troop strength in the East temporarily.
Because of the massive loses sustained during the autumn and
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winter of 1942-1943, the German array implemented a
reorganization of their military units and reduced their
table of organization strengths. Fortunately for the
Germans, the reduction in manpower was in most instances
offset by the introduction of more and better weapons. The
inclusion of a 120mm mortar platoon in each infantry regiment
compensated to some extent for the reduction in infantry
strength. In the Panzer and Panzergrenadier divisions the
introduction of the new Panther and Tiger tanks as well as
the newer versions of the Stg III assault gun gave the German
units more firepower. German divisions of 1943 were showing
signs of fatigue but were far from defeated.
The basic unit in the German army, the infantry
division, had a triangular organization based on three
infantry regiments with three infantry battalions each. The
divisional support units consisted of an artillery regiment,
an antitank battalion, an engineer battalion, a
reconnaissance battalion, a signal battalion, and divisional
services. The 1939 table of organization called for a
strength of 17,200 officers and men, but divisions on the
Eastern Front were seldom if ever at full strength. After
improving briefly in the spring of 1943, the manpower
situation deteriorated rapidly after the Battle of Kursk.
The manpower shortage led to a reorganization of the infantry
division. The 1944 table of organization, introduced in the
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autumn of 1943, established a divisional strength of 12,300.
The reduction was achieved by eliminating one of the
5 8
battalions from each of the regiments.
TABLE 8. GERMAN INFANTRY DIVISION ORGANIZATION
1944
1
12,352
5,500
48
28
21/14
18
6
36
12
615
4656
1
The 1944 TO&E organization was implemented in the Fall of 1943.
Source: The Organization of German Ground Forces, DATA SHEET .
Simulations
Publications, Inc., 1971.: German Army Order of Batt le 1939-1945, Vol. 1,
p. 77.
The main strengths of the infantry division were its
artillery regiment and the superior training of the German
infantrymen. As the situation on the Eastern Front
deteriorated after Kursk, the infantry divisions became more
vulnerable. The loss of air superiority made the divisional
artillery vulnerable to Soviet air attack. The need for
manpower led to a decrease in the amount of training given to
TO&E 1939-194
MEN 17,200
Infantry 8,000
Mortars
81mm 53
120mm —
Antitank Guns
37mm 75
75mm Towed/Sp --
Artillery
7 5mm I . G
.
20
150mm 1.6. 6
105mm How. 40
150mm How. 8
Motor vehicles 942
Horses 5375
45
infantrymen. The main weakness of the Infantry division
remained its lack of motorization. The immense frontage
which a division had to cover, sometimes up to 25 kilometers,
precluded any fixed defense in depth and the lack of
motorization made a mobile defense difficult. 5 The armored
and mechanized forces had to carry the full burden of mobile
defense.
The Panzergrenadier division (PG) was basically a
motorized infantry division, two infantry regiments of three
battalions each, with motorized support units. The 1941
Table of Organization established the divisions strength at
16,400. The introduction of a tank or assault gun battalion
in 1942-1943 gave the PG division an armored component and
thus more striking power. Late in 1943 the Panzergrenadier
divisions were reorganized. The TO&E strength was reduced to
13,876. The main strength of the PG division was its
offensive punch combined with its staying power. This kind
of division was able to keep up with the rapid advance of the
Panzer divisions but, unlike the Panzer divisions, could hold
its own when dealing with enemy infantry.
The Panzer division was the main offensive component of
the German army. The organization of the Panzer division
remained fairly constant from 1941 onward. The division was
reorganized and trimmed down slightly in late 1943. The 1941
TO&E called for 14,000 officers and men while the 1944 TO&E
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TABLE 9. GERMAN PANZE:RGRENiiDIER DIVISIC
TOSE 1941-•1943 1944
1
Men 16 ,400 13,800
Mortars: 81mm 42 52
120mm — 24
Antiaircraft Guns 12 66
Antitank Guns
Towed 75 38
Self-propelled -- 44
Artillery
Towed 44 24
sel f-propel led 6 30
AFV. Tanks — 48
Armored Cars 30 38
note: The 1944 T0&E organization was implemented in the Fall of 1943.
Source: The Organization of German Ground Forces, DATA SHEET . Simulations
Publications, Inc., 1971.: German Army Order of Battle, Vol 1 , p. 93.
TABLE 10. GERMAN PANZER DIVISION ORGANIZATION
.1
T0SE 1941.-1943 1944* SS
Men 15, 600 13,700 17 ,200
Mortars: 81mm 30 46 58
120mm — 16 24
Antiaircraft guns 74 82 122
Antitank Guns
Towed 83 20 24
Self-propelled 31 47 71
Arti 1 lery
Towed 56 24 24
Self-propelled 6 42 84
AFV: Tanks 108 103 126
Armored Cars 30 38 38
note: The 1944 T0&E organization was implemented in the Fall of 1943.
Source: The Organization of German Ground Forces, DATA SHEET . Simulations
Publications, Inc., 1971.: German Army Order of Battle, Vol 1
,
p. 93.
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called for 13,725. The main change was a reduction in the
number of tanks per division. The main strength of the
Panzer division was its firepower and mobility, its shock
effect. Whereas the armored forces had begun the Russian
campaign with obsolete Mark I, Mark II, and Czech 38 tanks,
by July 1943 they were receiving the new Mark V Panther and
Mark VI Tiger tanks. Although the total number of vehicles
per division decreased the offensive combat power of the
division increased. Whenever the Germans could organize a
Panzer division at full strength, the Soviets had cause for
alarm. In July 1943 the German Panzer divisions were rested,
refitted, and reequipped for combat.
Although the Infantry, Panzergrenadier , and Panzer were
the major divisional organizations, the Germans had several
others in limited use. The SS had four Panzer divisions
which had priority with regard to replacements and equipment.
The SS divisions were usually up to strength and had more
equipment then a regular army Panzer division. To alleviate
the manpower shortage in 1942, the Luftwaffe formed its own
infantry divisions for combat on the Eastern Front. The
divisions were poorly trained and took up valuable men and
materials that could have been better utilized. Most of the
Luftwaffe divisions were eventually integrated into regular
infantry units. There were also a few German mountain
divisions on the Eastern Front, mainly in northern Finland.
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Finally the Germans had a considerable number of troops tied
up in security divisions. The security forces were
responsible for maintaining order in the rear area.
Hitler's allies, the Rumanians, Hungarians, Italians,
and Finns, all contributed military units following the
invasion. The Axis allies suffered very heavy losses in the
Battle of Stalingrad. As a result of the heavy casualties
suffered and the deteriorating situation in southern Europe,
the Italian government withdrew its surviving units in the
spring of 1943. Rumania and Hungary rebuilt their units. By
the summer of 1943 there were several Hungarian security
divisions aiding Army Group Center and several Rumanian
divisions were located in the Crimea. 61
CHAPTER V
PHASE ONE: THE BATTLE OF KURSK
The first phase of the Soviet summer campaign divides
into two stages, the defensive (July 5th-23rd) , and the
counteroffensive (July 12th-August 23rd) . During the latter
the army conducted two major operations: the Orel Offensive
(Operation Kutuzov
, July 12th-August 18th) , and the Kharkov
Offensive (Operation Rumyantsev
, August 3rd-23rd) . At Kursk
the Soviet forces assumed a deliberately defensive posture
and destroyed the German's offensive capability and ended the
myth of German invincibility during the summer campaign
season. At Orel and Kharkov the Germans lost their last
chance for victory in the East, and the Soviet forces gained
the strategic initiative. By the end of August the German
offensive forces were in ruins, the reserves built up during
the spring were gone, and the remaining German units were
spread thinly along the entire Eastern Front. The fighting
during the Battle of Kursk opened the way to the Dnieper.
KURSK: THE DEFENSIVE STAGE
During the first stage of the Kursk battle, the Soviet
army implemented a very active defense. The Soviet defense
emphasized maneuver and counterattack. Armored forces formed
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MAP II
Situation On The Eve of the Battle of Kursk, 5 July 1943
Source: Soviet Military Review
, No. 7 (July 1968), p. 2.
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the backbone of the defense. Both the Central and Voronezh
Fronts had a tank army in the second echelon as well as
several independent tank corps. In strategic reserve, the
Steppe Front had an additional tank army, three tank corps,
and a mechanized corps. The Soviet strategy at Kursk was to
stop the enemy in the defense zones and then destroy him with
aggressive counterattacks.
To penetrate the Soviet defenses the Germans massed an
impressive force. The 9th Army fielded fourteen infantry,
six Panzer, and one Panzergrenadier division against the
Central Front. General Rokossovsky ' s 13th Army backed up by
the 2nd Tank Army had the task of defeating the northern
thrust. In the south the 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment
Kempf (ADK) massed ten infantry, eight Panzer, and one
Panzergrenadier division. The 6th and 7th Guards Armies
supported by the 1st Tank and 69th Armies opposed the
southern thrust. " The Steppe Front, in reserve east of
Kursk, contained another tank army, four combined-arms armies
and several tank and mechanized corps. Against a combined
strength of over 900,000 men, nearly 10,000 guns and mortars,
and 2,700 armored vehicles the Central and Voronezh Fronts
fielded over 1.3 million men, 19,300 guns and mortars and
3,306 armored vehicles. The Steppe Front contained a further
half a million men, 8,500 guns and mortars, and 1,500
64tanks. Although outnumbered in total forces, the Germans
were able to gain local superiority at the point of attack.
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At 2230 on July 4th, after analyzing intelligence
reports from the forward units, the artillery of the 6th
Guards Army commenced firing. The counterbombardment fire
was directed against the German assembly areas and the masses
of troops and machines preparing for the next day's attack.
Early the next morning, at 0400, General Vatutin repeated the
counterbombardment in the sectors of the 6th and 7th Guards
Armies. To the north General Rokossovsky ' s 13th Army began
its artillery counterbombardment early on July 5th. The
Soviet fire caused considerable damage and confusion within
the German units. The German attack was delayed two hours in
the north and three in the south.
The long awaited German offensive began early on July
5th. In the north Model's 9th Army quickly bogged down in
Soviet defenses. The attack along the Olkhovatka axis
managed to advance a mere four kilometers the first day.
On the 6th General Rokossovsky introduced his 2nd Tank Army
into the battle. The Soviet armor fought a meeting
engagement with a Panzer formation and suffered heavy losses.
As a result Rokossovsky ordered his units over to the
defensive and strengthened the 13th Army sector with units
from the 60th and 65th Armies, both occupying quiet stretches
of the front. Repeated attacks supported by large numbers of
tanks failed to break the Soviet defenses. In an attempt to
regain the initiative, Model shifted the main thrust of his
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attack to the Ponyri axis. The 9th Army threw itself at the
Ponyri defenses for four days but failed to dislodge the
Soviet defenders. After six days of fighting the 9th Army
had managed to make a twelve kilometer indentation in the
Soviet line. The German units were exhausted and their
ranks depleted.
To the south Generals Hoth and Kempf were only slightly
more successful. The 4th Panzer Army advanced seven to nine
kilometers in the center of the 6th Guards Army while Army
Detachment Kempf managed to establish a small bridgehead on
the east bank of the Donets River. By evening Vatutin had
ordered his second echelon and reserves into the battle. To
strengthen his antitank defenses, many of the 1st Tank Army's
armored vehicles were dug in and used as immobile antitank
weapons. Despite the infusion of reinforcements the German
armored units continued to fight their way forward, six
kilometers on the 6th, another seven on the 8th and five more
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on July 9th. To stop the advance of 4th Panzer Army,
additional reinforcements were committed. The Steppe Front
entered the battle. The 27th Army and 4th Guards Tank Corps
moved to Kursk while the 53rd Army and 1st Mechanized Corps
took up positions southeast of Kursk along the Seim River.
The 5th Guards Army entered the front line between Oboyan and
Prokhorovka. The 5th Guards Tank Army moved north of
Prokhorovka.
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On the 11th the 4th Panzer Army altered directions and
moved against Prokhorovka. Army Detachment Kempf continued
to drive north along the both banks of the Donets. Early on
July 12th the 4th Panzer Army met the 5th Guards Tank Army
west of Prokhorovka. The resulting engagement, the greatest
tank battle of World War II, involved more then twelve
hundred tanks and assault guns. 69 The Soviet tanks moved in
close and negated the German advantage in long-range gunnery
and armor. At close range the guns of both sides were
equally effective. The 5th Guards Tank Army lost more then
four hundred armored vehicles while the Germans lost over
three hundred.
The German forces in the Prokhorovka area continued to
probe the Soviet defenses for several days but lacked the
means to continue the offensive. Worried about the probable
collapse of Italy after the Western Allies invaded Sicily on
July 10th, Hitler ordered the offensive cancelled on July
13th. General Model, now commanding both the 9th and 2nd
Panzer Armies, had already ceased offensive operations in
order to halt the Soviet drive for Orel. Even though the
northern thrust of the offensive had been stopped, von
Manstein felt that the attack in the south should continue.
He argued that the Soviet reserves of armor were nearly gone
and that if the pressure was maintained a little longer the
Soviets would be unable to launch offensive operations for
55
some time. Hitler gave von Manstein permission to destroy
the remaining Soviet armored formations. Von Manstein claims
that even this was denied him when Hitler ordered several of
his armored formations transferred to AGC. Short of armor
the 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf began pulling
back on July 16th. By the 23rd they were back to their
original jumping off points. The defensive phase of the
Battle of Kursk ended. 71
During the defensive phase of the battle the Soviet
forces fulfilled their objectives. They repulsed the German
offensive, destroyed most of the enemy reserves, and defeated
the best troops the Germans could muster. The Panzer
divisions, a necessary part of an effective mobile defense,
were decimated. The II SS Panzer Corps with three divisions,
the elite of the German armored forces, had only 183 out of
72425 tanks and 64 out of 110 assault guns remaining. The
other Panzer divisions were even worse off. The Soviets
claimed 70,000 German officers and men killed, and 2,952
tanks and 195 assault guns destroyed. " The combination of
defensive zones, well positioned strategic reserves, and the
tenacity of the Soviet soldiers defeated the German forces.
The Battle of Kursk severely wounded the German army in
southern Russia. The Soviet High Command had no intention of
letting the Germans recover.
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Field Marshal von Manstein's view of the Kursk campaign
demonstrate his failure to grasp the key features of Soviet
operational art. He views the Battle of Kursk not as an
operational problem but as a tactical one. Throughout the
battle the German forces continually shifted their axis of
attack in search of the tactical solution. Von Mellenthin's
account of the battle deals almost exclusively with the
tactical problems at Kursk. He attributes the German defeat
to the failure of the new armor and the strength of the
Soviet forces. The new Panther tanks had a tendency to catch
fire, and the Henschel Tiger tank had no machine gun for
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close in support. The Germans kept searching for the one
big victory that would end the war. Once their tactics
failed the Germans were militarily bankrupt. The only
solution von Manstein could come up with was to continue the
battle in order to destroy the remaining Soviet armor
reserves. He advocated a battle of attrition even though his
reserves were gone and his forces depleted. His solution
typified the failure of German military thinking on the
Eastern Front.
The Soviet authors approach the Battle of Kursk from a
different direction. Rather then dealing almost totally with
tactical aspects, the Soviets examine the battle as part of a
whole. General A. Luchinsky in "On Certain Questions in the
Development of Strategy and Operational Art in the Battle of
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Kursk" stresses that the defensive phase of the Battle of
Kursk was merely the first phase in a Soviet plan to defeat
the Germans east of the Dnieper River. The Soviet High
Command approached the 1943 summer - autumn campaign as an
operational problem. They wanted to drive the Germans out of
the Eastern Ukraine. Their solution was to pit strength
against weakness. They adopted a deliberately defensive
posture and let the Germans burn themselves out. At the
appropriate time the Soviets began offensive operations.
Unlike German Blitzkrieg theory which envisioned a quick
victory in a single campaign, Soviet doctrine called for the
destruction of the enemy not with one blow but with a series
of successive operations. On July 12th the first of many
offensive operations against AGC and AGS began.
The OREL OFFENSIVE: OPERATION KUTUZOV
The STAVKA plan, "Operation Kutuzov , " called for a
three-pronged attack. The 11th Guards Army, commanded by
General Bagramyan, of the West Front was to strike south
while the 3rd, 61st, and 63rd Armies of the Bryansk Front
attacked west toward Orel. The Central Front would drive
northward linking up with the 11th Guards Army west of Orel.
The three thrusts were to encircle most of the 2nd Panzer
Army in the Orel area. The High Command hoped to reduce the
Orel Bulge and eliminate the German forces in the area.
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The offensive began at 0320 on July 12th. All along the
front thousands of Soviet guns and mortars opened fire, three
7 8thousand on the West Front alone. Along the north face of
the Orel bulge, Bagramyan's 11th Guards Army quickly pierced
the German forward defenses. Unfortunately, Bagramyan lacked
the necessary armored and mechanized forces to exploit the
breakthrough. STAVKA transferred the 4th Tank Army to the
West Front. The 11th Guards Army advanced twenty-five
Kilometers the first two days but stiffening German
resistance and a lack of armored units hindered any further
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advance.
By the time the Central Front's 13th Army joined the
offensive on July 15th, the 2nd Panzer and 9th Armies were
beginning to stabilize their positions. In the north they
halted Bagramyan's advance and continued to occupy Bolkhov.
In an attempt to regain the initiative General M. Popov
ordered the 3rd Guards Tank Army, commanded by General P.
Rybalko, into the offensive. Directed to advance toward
Kromy, the tank army promptly ran into two Panzer divisions.
Rybalko' s advance came to a halt with the loss of many tanks.
The 3rd Guards Tank Army then turned northeast and managed to
disengage.
While the fighting raged around Orel, Soviet partisans
did their part to disrupt the German transportation and
communication network. On July 17th, the Central Staff of
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the Partisan Movement issued orders calling for a campaign
against the rail network in German rear. In the last half of
July the partisans destroyed 7,500 rails in the Orel oblast
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alone. The effort to deny the Germans use of the railroads
was a limited success and diverted large numbers of German
troops for guard and construction duty.
North of Orel the German line hinged on Bolkhov. The
Soviet forces repeatedly assaulted the town but were unable
to dislodge the German defenders. On July 26th the 4th Tank
Army, having finally arrived at the front, attacked Bolkhov
with the 11th Tank and 6th Guards Mechanized Corps. The next
day the 30th Tank Corps joined the battle. In two days of
heavy fighting the 4th Tank Army managed to advance only two
kilometers. As the 4th Tank Army threw itself at the Bolkhov
defenses, the 61st Army advanced against the town from the
east. To avoid encirclement the German defenders pulled out
and the 61st Army occupied the town on July 29th.
As the Soviet and German forces fought for control of
the Orel bulge, Adolf Hitler decided the issue. Worried
about the defection of Italy, Hitler ordered Army Group
Center to pull back to the Hagen Position, a defensive line
running north and south through Bryansk. He hoped to free
troops for Italy by shortening his lines. On August 1st
Hitler ordered the immediate evacuation of the Orel salient.
The Soviet forces pursued the retreating Germans, liberating
Orel on August 5th.
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Following the liberation of Orel, STAVKA expanded the
offensive in the north. On the 7th of August the Western
Front, with the 5th, 10th Guards, 33rd, 68th, and 10th
Armies, attacked the German positions in the Spas-Demensk
area. The plan called for a drive on Roslavl which would
open the way to Smolensk and enable Soviet units to outflank
the German Hagen positions. Spas-Demensk fell on August
13th. On Sokolovsky's right flank, the 39th and 43rd Armies
of the Kalinin Front, commanded by Yeremenko, joined the
offensive. The two armies attacked toward Smolensk from the
northeast. After five days of heavy fighting the two armies
8
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were only able to advance three kilometers. Faced with
heavily fortified German positions around Smolensk and
Bryansk STAVKA ordered the offensive halted on the 18th in
order to regroup.
In support of Operation Kutuzov the South Front
assaulted the Mius River line, beginning on July 17th. The
battle raged until the end of July at which time General
Tolbukhin's troops were forced back across the Mius. The
offensive on the South Front failed to break the German line
but did serve an important function. Badly needed German
troops were tied down along the Mius when they were needed
farther north.
Although a major success, Operation Kutuzov demonstrated
several weaknesses in Soviet operations and tactics. The use
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of the armored forces proved disastrous. Both tank armies
were quickly neutralized in head-on bouts with German Panzer
divisions. The tank units were not introduced at the
appropriate time nor given the correct mission. When they
could have been used to achieve major encirclements, the two
tank armies were sent against fortified German positions.
Despite its problems the Soviet military succeeded in
retaking Orel and eliminated the Orel bulge. The offensive
further weakened the German 9th Army and eliminated any
remaining reserves in the Orel - Bryansk area. As Orel fell
the forces of the Voronezh, Steppe and Southwest Fronts were
already moving on Kharkov.
THE KHARKOV OFFENSIVE: OPERATION RUMYANTSEV
The Voronezh, Steppe, and Southwest Fronts began
Operation Rumyantsev on August 3rd. The operation had two
objectives; the liberation of Kharkov and the destruction of
the 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf. In
conjunction with the Rumyantsev Operation STAVKA began
preparing a general offensive to destroy the German forces in
the Eastern Ukraine while gaining bridgeheads on the west
bank of the Dnieper River. While Operation Rumyantsev was in
progress, Soviet forces kept the German forces engaged both
north and south of Kharkov. In the north the West Front
attacked as part of the expanded Orel offensive; in the south
the Southwest and South Fronts struck along the Donets and
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Mius Rivers. The two flank attacks had the dual purpose of
tying up German reserves along the front and gained important
jumping off points for the upcoming Dnieper offensive.
Preparations for the drive on Kharkov began as the
German assault on Kursk ground to a halt. To strengthen the
Voronezh and Steppe Fronts, additional units and supplies
were stripped from other fronts. Four artillery divisions
were removed from the Bryansk Front and sent south. During
the last two weeks of July, ammunition for twelve to fifteen
days of continuous operations, food for a week, and fuel for
ten to twelve days was stockpiled. 82 While supplies were
relatively easy to assemble, the refitting of the armored
units was more difficult. The 1st Tank Army had lost half
its tanks during the intense fighting south of Oboyan. To
rebuild its strength, Katukov relied on rebuilt and repaired
tanks and had to search the field and rear area hospitals for
tank crewman.
Marshal Zhukov hoped to avoid the mistakes of the
Kutuzov Operation. Zhukov wanted better artillery
preparation, more air support, and better utilization of
armored units. Zhukov planned to achieve a decisive
breakthrough by massing artillery, tanks, and aircraft. Each
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tank army was assigned one corps of ground attack aircraft.
Zhukov emphasized the need to commit the armored forces at
the appropriate time. The failure to do so during the Orel
64
operation had slowed the advance dramatically. For the
Kharkov offensive, Zhukov massed seventy tanks and 230
artillery pieces per kilometer of front in the 1st and 5th
fi sGuards Tank Armies sectors.
Zhukov planned to hit the junction between the 4th
Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf. Vatutin's Voronezh
Front was to force Hoth's units westward while Konev's Steppe
Front forced Army Detachment Kempf south. Malinovsky's
Southwest Front was to send an army west to cut off Kharkov
from the south. To execute the plan Vatutin massed the 6th
Guards, 5th Guards, and 53rd Armies as well as the XLVIII
Rifle Corps of 69th Army. Vatutin's second echelon consisted
of the 1st and 5th Guards Tank Armies. On .the right flank
the 40th and 27th Armies would attack toward Akhtyrka. To
mask the attack preparations, the 38th Army on the far right
flank of the Voronezh Front undertook a deception operation.
On the Steppe Front Konev had the 69th and 7th Guards Armies
for the assault on Kharkov. Directly east of Kharkov
Malinovsky's 57th Army stood ready to advance on Merefa to
cut Kharkov's communications with the south.
Operation Rumyantsev began at 0500 on August 3rd. For
the next three hours 6,000 Soviet guns and mortars fired on
the German positions. Following the massive artillery
preparation and air strikes, the assault units of the 5th and
6th Guards Armies attacked. By 1100 the infantry had
65
penetrated the first German defense zone, and the 1st and 5th
Guards Tank Armies rolled forward. The Steppe Front
encountered stiff resistance at Belgorod. In response to the
Soviet onslaught, von Manstein called for reinforcements. To
shore up the crumbling wall north of Kharkov, four Panzer
divisions were recalled from Izyum area south of Kharkov.
Within a couple of days the Soviet offensive began to
gain momentum. Vatutin's Voronezh Front advanced twenty
kilometers the first day and had advanced a hundred
8 7kilometers by the 8th. To exploit this success Zhukov
ordered the 40th and 27th Armies to join the offensive. This
widened the breakthrough area and threatened several German
units with encirclement. Konev cleared Belgorod on the 5th.
Free to advance on Kharkov, Konev then moved south. In three
days a 40 kilometer gap had been opened between the two
8 8German armies. On August 7th armored forces liberated
Bogodukov, 112 kilometers from their starting positions. The
gap between the 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf
8 9
grew to 50 kilometers on the 8th. As Konev neared Kharkov
he ordered the 53rd and 5th Guards Tank Armies against the
city from the northwest while the 69th and 7th Guards Armies
attacked from the northeast. The 5 7th Army advanced on
Kharkov from the southeast. STAVKA ordered Vatutin to cut
the communication lines running from Kharkov to Poltava,
Krasnograd, and Lozowaya. On the August 11th unit of
66
Katukov's 1st Tank Army severed the Kharkov to Poltava rail
line. The German units in Kharkov were nearly encircled.
As the Voronezh Front advanced and pushed the 4th Panzer
Army and Army Detachment Kempf apart, its flanks became more
vulnerable. By August 11th German armor in the Akhtyrka area
threatened the right flank of 1st Tank and 6th Guards Army
while the Panzer divisions coming from the south put pressure
on their left flank. The German forces counterattacked
toward Bogodukov to reopen the Kharkov-Poltava rail line.
After two days of fighting the Germans failed to reach
Bogodukov although the rail line was recaptured.
While the Voronezh Front wrestled with the German armor,
Konev's forces moved closer to Kharkov. By August 19th the
53rd Army had fought his way through the dense woods west and
northwest of the city. The heavy fighting reduced the 5th
90Guards Tank Army to 150 tanks. As the 57th Army approached
from the south and the 69th Army moved in from the northwest,
the German units in Kharkov began evacuating the city.
During the night of August 22nd Konev launched a surprise
night assault to clear out the remaining Germans. At noon on
August 23rd Operation Rumyantsev officially ended. The loss
of Kharkov and its important transportation and rail
facilities weakened the German supply system and provided the
Soviets with a base for future operations.
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As the Kharkov operation gained momentum, the South
and Southwestern Fronts went into action. Malinovsky's
Southwestern Front launched an offensive across the Donets on
the 13th of August. Malinovsky's primary goal was to cover
Konev's left flank while advancing southwest into the Donbas
region. Tolbukhin's South Front attacked on the 18th of
August. Proceeded by a massive artillery bombardment,
Tolbukhin's men assaulted the German positions on the Mius.
By the end of the month the Mius line broke and the Germans
were forced to retreat to the Kalmius River.
In contrast to Operation Kutuzov , the use of Soviet
units improved drastically in the course of Operation
Rumyantsev . The operations of the 1st and 5th Guards Tank
Armies were very successful. Zhukov's efforts to improve the
coordination and effectiveness of the armor, air, and
artillery forces contributed to the Soviet success at
Kharkov. The offensive eliminated the few remaining Army
Group South reserves and further depleted the already thin
ranks of the German line units.
The Battle of Kursk with its defensive and
counterof fensive stages lasted fifty days. During that
period the German offensive threat was eliminated and the
German assault groupings destroyed. Operation Kutuzov
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eliminated the Orel salient and Soviet forces advanced 150
kilometers to the west. Operation Rumyantsev crippled the
enemy forces south of Kursk and liberated Kharkov. During
the Rumyantsev Operation Soviet forces advanced 140
kilometers on a 500 kilometer front. According to Soviet
sources, the German army suffered a half million casualties,
lost 1,500 armored vehicles, and more then 3,700 aircraft
during the battle. 92 The Battle of Kursk opened the way to
the Dnieper River by eliminating German manpower and
material; and more importantly it destroyed the myth of
German invincibility during the summer campaign season. The
Soviet army emerged from Kursk confident of its abilities,
confident of victory.
CHAPTER VI
PHASE TWO: DRIVE TO THE DNIEPER
The Soviet High Command finalized its plans for the
Dnieper Offensive in mid-August. On August 12th the Front
commanders received their orders. The West and Bryansk
Fronts were to liberate Bryansk and Smolensk and then push on
to the upper reaches of the Dnieper. Rokossovsky
' s Central
Front was to attack westward reaching a line Rylsk to Glukhov
to Novgorod Severskiy by September 3rd. Vatutin and the
Voronezh Front were to advance on Kremenchug via Poltava
where his units were to cross the Dnieper and establish
bridgeheads. The Steppe Front was to advance on Krasnograd
and then establish bridgeheads over the Dnieper in the
Dnepropetrovsk area. The Southwest and South Fronts were to
liberate the Donbas Region and advance to the lower Dnieper,
trapping the Axis forces in the Crimea. In conjunction with
the Soviet advance, special partisan groups were to harass
the Germans, cut communications, and hinder the movement of
reserves to the Eastern Ukraine. 93
Supplies became a major consideration. During the
Battle of Kursk the Central and Voronezh Fronts had expended
huge amounts of eguipment, fuel, and ammunition. The
offensive operations of the other Fronts expended large
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amounts of supplies as well. By mid-August keeping the large
number of units in the field was becoming a problem. The
stockpiles built up in May and June were depleted. In July
and August the Soviet forces had received 26,619,000 shells
and mines. During the same period, they had used
9442,105,000. The supply dumps were nearing empty, and the
Soviet transportation system was pushed to the limit trying
to move supplies to the front. As the army advanced into
liberated territory, the German destruction of the railroads
hampered the supply effort further. The weakened condition
of the tank armies presented the Front commanders with
another problem. The strongest tank army on the 25th of
August was the 2nd Tank Army with 265 tanks. The 1st Tank
Army had 162 and the 5th Guards had 153 tanks. 95 The tank
armies and corps were in desperate need of refit. Despite
these difficulties the Soviet forces continued the offensive.
THE SOUTHWEST AND SOUTH FRONTS
The front commanders implemented their orders as soon as
possible. On August 13th the Southwest Front attacked across
the Donets south of Izyum. The German 1st Panzer Army
succeeded in repelling the Soviet forces but did so at high
cost. By August 23rd the German corps south of Izyum had a
combat strength of only 5,800 men and was unable to hold a
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continuous line. During the night of September 2nd General
Malinovsky sent the 3rd Guards Army across the Donets and
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prepared a final assault on the German positions. However
before he could implement his plan, the High Command ordered
him to transfer two corps and five divisions to STAVKA
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reserve. The transfers forced Malinovsky to delay his
attack.
Meanwhile Tolbukhin's South Front attacked on August
18th. Tolbukhin assaulted the German positions on the Mius
River southeast of Golodayevka. Supported by several
thousand guns and mortars, units of the 5th Shock Army
breached the heavily fortified German positions. Tolbukhin
managed to deceive the Germans by rebuilding the assault
units in the line rather then bringing up new fresh units for
the attack. German intelligence failed to detect the buildup
and took the lack of new units on the South Front as a sign
that an offensive was not likely in the near future. The
intensity of the attack combined with the element of surprise
contributed to Tolbukhin's success. By the end of the 18th
the 5th Shock Army had achieved a breakthrough 6 kilometers
9 8deep and 2 kilometers wide.
During the night and the following day the Soviet forces
spread out north and south of the breakthrough area. General
Hollidt, the commander of the German 6th Army, decided not to
seal off the expanding breakthrough because he lacked
sufficient troops to hold an extended front. He opted to
close the 3 kilometer gap in his lines, thereby trapping the
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Soviet forces which had advanced through the gap. On the
night of August 20th using the weak 13th Panzer Division
Hollidt attacked. The 13th Panzer, a mere Karapfgruppe,
almost succeeded in its mission; but the 4th Guards
Mechanized Corps halted its advance, turned a hundred and
eighty degrees, and saved the Soviet position. Attacking on
the morning of the 21st the 4th Mechanized Corps pushed the
Germans back and by nightfall had expanded the breakthrough
to a width of 13 kilometers. The 13th Panzer division tried
once more on August 23rd. Two mechanized corps halted the
German drive 5 kilometers short of its destination. The
Germans were unable to contain the Soviet breakthrough. The
Soviet bridgehead compromised the entire German line along
99the Mius River.
On August 27th the 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps turned
south from the breakthrough area and headed for the Sea of
Azov. The Soviet units were now behind the German XXIX Corps
which held the right flank of the 6th Army. Against a force
of 130,000 Soviet frontline troops supported by 160-170
tanks, the 6th Army had 35,000 frontline troops and 7
tanks. To ease the pressure on the 29th Corps, von
Manstein sent reinforcements to 6th Army. These consisted of
two weak divisions, one Panzer and one Infantry. Hollidt
organized the two divisions into a Corps. The 2nd Guards
Mechanized Corps reached the coast west of Taganrog on August
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29th. Encircled by Soviet forces the German 29th Corps
prepared to breakout. With the aid of the 13th Panzer
Division the 29th Corps, nearly 9,000 men and a few assault
guns strong, succeeded in breaking out. On the 30th
Tolbukhin's forces, assisted by the Azov Flotilla commanded
by Rear-Admiral Gorshkov, liberated Taganrog. Field Marshal
von Manstein authorized the withdrawal of the 6th Army and
right flank of the 1st Panzer Army to the Kalmius river.
On the morning of September 6th Malinovsky renewed his
assault on the right flank of the 1st Panzer Army. The
German withdrawal from the Mius had forced the right flank of
1st Panzer Army to pull back also. Under the weight of nine
infantry divisions and the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps the
102German line collapsed quickly. The XXIII Tanks corps
moved in to exploit the breakthrough. In conjunction with
the I Guards Mechanized Corps the two corps rolled westward.
The breakthrough by Malinovsky' s units undermined the entire
Kalmius line, and the Germans were forced to begin another
retreat. By September 8th the XXIII Tank and I Guards
Mechanized Corps were a 160 kilometers behind the German
lines near Pavlovgrad and Sinelnikovo, a mere 50 kilometers
from the Dnieper.
Following the collapse of the Mius River line,
Tolbukhin's forces had pursued the Germans to the Kalmius
River. Reinforced with thirteen infantry divisions, the XI
7 5
and XX Tank Corps, and the V Guards Cavalry Corps, Tolbukhin
104continued to advance. On September 8th the 5th Shock Army
liberated Stalino, the capital of the Donbas. Mariupol fell
on September 10th.
Faced with the deteriorating position of Army Group
South, Field Marshal von Manstein requested permission for
AGS to retreat to the WOTAN position (Dnieper)
. On September
8th Hitler gave authorization for the 1st Panzer and 6th
Armies to retreat. The two armies were to take up positions
between Melitopol and Zaporozhe on the Molochnaya River. 105
On September 12th the right flank of the 1st Panzer Army
finally regained contact with the left flank of 6th Army.
Unfortunately for Malinovsky his 23rd Tank Corps and 1st
Guards Mechanized Corps were west of the reformed German
line. During the night of the 12th Malinovsky ordered the
two corps to reverse course and head east for friendly lines.
For the next two days they tried to breakout. Finally, on
the night of the 14th the remnants of the two corps slipped
through a hole in the German lines and reached safety. With
the elimination of the Soviet spearhead, the German 6th Army
and the 1st Panzer Army began a more organized retreat to the
Dnieper. Both the Southwest and South Fronts pursued the
retreating Germans. During the week September 25th to 30th,
the right flank of the Southwest front crossed the Dnieper
river on the march south of Dnepropetrovsk while the left
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flank reached the German line east of Zaporozhe. The 6th
Army of the Southwest Front established two bridgeheads on
the west bank of the Dnieper. To the south Tolbukhin's South
Front reached the new German positions along the Molochnaya
river by the end of September. The Southwest and South
Fronts then prepared for the next phase of the operation, the
battle for the bridgeheads.
THE CENTRAL AND BRYANSK FRONTS
The Central and Bryansk Fronts, delayed by supply
problems, began their offensive on August 26th. Rokossovsky
aimed his offensive at the right flank of the German 9th Army
and at the center of the German 2nd Army near Sevsk. The
65th Army met fierce resistance in the 9th Army sector and
progress slowed to a crawl. Rokossovsky put the 2nd Tank
Army into the attack with the 6 5th Army. A German
counterattack with three divisions, two infantry and a
Panzer, on August 29th stopped the 65th and 2nd Tank Army.
To the south the 60th Army and the 9th Tank Corps achieved a
breakthrough, liberated Sevsk, and headed west. While the
2nd Tank Army bogged down in the German defenses, the 60th
Army made rapid progress which threatened to cut the German
2nd Army in two. Rokossovsky decided to shift his main
emphasis from north to south. He redeployed the 13th Army
and 2nd Tank Army. By August 30th the penetration in the
Sevsk sector was a hundred kilometers wide and seventy
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kilometers deep. The Soviet breakthrough threatened the
southern flank of AGC and the northern flank of AGS.
The situation deteriorated further on the 1st and 2nd of
September when the German 13th Corps was driven south of the
Seim river separating it from the 2nd Army and opening a 30
kilometer gap between Army Group Center and Army Group South.
On the 6th Rokossovsky ' s units liberated Konotop, a hundred
and sixty kilometers from the Soviet starting positions. By
the 8th the depth of the advance reached 180 kilometers.
The Central Front pushed ever closer to the Dnieper. On
September 9th, the 60th Army liberated Bakhmach, an important
railroad junction. Soviet troops crossed the Desna south of
Novgorod-Severski and established a number of bridgeheads on
the 11th. On the 15th the 60th and 13th Armies and the 7th
Guards Mechanized Corps liberated Nezhin.
Unlike the Central Front, the Bryansk Front had a
difficult time gaining momentum. The German defenses,
anchored on the city of Bryansk, were tough. On September
2nd Glushkovo and Sumy fell to Soviet forces. A Cavalry
Corps attacking south of Kirov broke through the German
lines, captured Zhukovka, and cut the Bryansk-Roslavl
railroad on the 9th. On the 15th Soviet forces liberated
Dyatkovo north of Kiev. The capture of the two cities
threatened Bryansk from the north. While Units of the 63rd
Army liberated Trubchevsk and crossed the Desna, the 11th
Guards Army liberated Bryansk. Stavka ordered Popov's
Bryansk Front to reach the Sozh river by the 2nd of October
and then to hit the flank of Army Group Center.
On September 15th, after more then a week of delay,
Hitler finally authorized a full scale retreat. The
remainder of AGS began withdrawing to the WOTAN position
(southern half of East Wall) while AGC began retreating to
the PANTHER position (northern half of East Wall). His
permission only legitimized the German situation. Along the
entire German front from Nevel to the Black Sea, the German
army was in retreat. The German soldiers, seeking the safety
of the west bank, hurried westward with the Soviet forces
close behind.
As the advance rolled westward, Rokossovsky prepared a
plan to destroy the northern flank of Army Group South. He
hoped to send the 60th Army south to link up with the 38th
Army of the Voronezh Front thereby trapping thirteen German
divisions. Zhukov, placing greater emphasis on reaching the
10 8Dnieper, vetoed the plan. The main Soviet concern was to
get to the Dnieper and across before the Germans could do
anything to stop them. On September 19th units of
Rokossovsky ' s right flank reached the Dnieper in the
Chernobyl area. By the end of the month, they established a
25 kilometers deep bridgehead along both banks of the Pripet
up to Chernobyl. 109
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Meanwhile on the 19th and 20th Rokossovsky continued the
assault across the Desna on both sides of Chernigov. The
German 2nd Army could not hold and began advancing north
toward the important rail junction of Gomel. On the 21st the
left flank of the Central Front liberated Chernigov and
reached the Dnieper. The 13th Army began crossing the
Dnieper on the 22nd. By the end of the month the entire
Central Front had reached the Dnieper and was fighting its
way across. During the period, September 22nd-29th, the
13th, 60th, and 61st established seven separate bridgeheads
across the Dnieper.
THE VORONEZH AND STEPPE FRONTS
Whereas the Central Front had a week to regroup after
the Orel offensive, the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts moved
directly from the Rumyantsev Operation into the Dnieper
offensive. Kharkov fell on August 23rd, and the two fronts
pushed on toward the Dnieper. Through the end of August and
into the mid-September, the German 8th Army (formally Army
Detachment Kempf) and 4th Panzer Army fought desperately to
stop the Soviets from breaking through. While the Germans
had received few replacements and reinforcements since Kursk,
the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts received major reinforcements.
The Voronezh Front received Rybalko's 3rd Guards Tank,
Koroteev's 52nd, and P. A. Belov's 61st Army. The Steppe
Front received P.M. Kozlov's 37th Army, and the 5th Guards
and 46th Armies from the Voronezh Front.
The Voronezh Front attacked on a broad front. By
September 14th the Soviet forces had split the 4th Panzer
Army into three pieces. A drive by the 38th and 40th Armies
against the left flank of 4th Panzer Army split the German
line, while on the right flank attacks by the 27th and 47th
Armies broke through between the Psel and Vorskla river. The
advances of the Central Front threatened to encircle the left
flank of 4th Panzer Army. Since the collapse of the 4th
Panzer Army jeopardized the entire German line to the south
and there were no reinforcements available, the German units
began withdrawing following Hitler's authorization of a full
scale retreat.
As the German 4th Panzer and 8th Armies withdrew to the
Dnieper, the Soviets pursued at full speed. The campaign
developed into a race for the Dnieper. The Germans had to
move to the available river crossings, get across, and then
fan out to cover the entire right bank of the river. The
Soviet forces had to force the river off the march before the
Germans could dig in on the far bank. The Voronezh Front
concentrated on the Rzhishev - Kanev area while the Steppe
Front pushed toward the Kremenchug - Dneprodzerzhinsk
area. On September 20th the 3rd Guards Tank Army was
committed in the 40th Army sector and in three days marched
112280-320 kilometers. During the night of the 22nd elements
of the 3rd Guards Tank and the 40th Armies reached the
Dnieper in the Vel-Bukrin area and began crossing on all
available means. By the 24th the Bukrin bridgehead was 16
kilometers wide. 113 On the 23rd units of the Steppe Front
liberated Poltava, the last major obstacle before the
Dnieper. The 37th and 7th Guards Armies reached the Dnieper
in the Dneprovokamenka - Domotkan area on the 24th and 25th
of September respectively.
On September 26th Vatutin launched a daring airborne
assault to expand and secure the Bukrin bridgehead. The plan
called for the three airborne brigades to drop into the
Bukrin bridgehead with the mission of blocking German forces
then converging on the bridgehead. While the paratroopers
were engaging the Germans, the Soviet troops in the
bridgehead were to expand and consolidate their gains. The
assault force, the 1st, 3rd, and 5th brigades, totaled ten
thousand men. 114 On the night of the 26th the 3rd and 5th
brigades were to drop with the 1st brigade following on the
second or third night. From the very beginning of the
operation things began to go wrong. There was a shortage of
aircraft and fuel. The planes arrived late and could not
carry as many men as planned. The troops of the 3rd brigade
were dropped but enemy flak forced the aircraft up and as a
result the paratroopers were scattered all over the
countryside. The 5th brigade had even less success. A
shortage of planes and refueling facilities led to the
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dispatching of single planes as they were refueled. The few
men dropped, around a thousand, were widely dispersed. The
operation was cancelled for lack of fuel before the remainder
of the brigade could be dropped. Only 4575 out 6600 men were
dropped during the night. Those that did make it in had
the misfortune to land in the midst of three German divisions
and were separated from their radios during the drop. Over
the next several day the paratroopers slowly grouped
together. By the end of the month there were 43 independent
groups operating behind the German lines.
While the paratroopers fought for their lives, the
armies of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts forced their way to
the Dnieper. The 5th Guards and 53rd Armies cleared
Kremenchug of Germans on September 29th. After the fall of
Kremenchug the Zaporozhe bridgehead remained the only German
territory east of the Dnieper between Kiev and Zaporozhe. By
the end of the month the 3rd Guards Tank, 38th, 40th, 47th
and 52nd Armies of the Voronezh Front had established nine
bridgeheads across the Dnieper. The three armies of the
Steppe Front, the 37th, 7th Guards, and 57th established
another five bridgeheads in their sector. Many of the
bridgeheads were small but the Soviet troops continued to
fight their way across. Despite fierce resistance the German
troops were unable to dislodge the Soviet forces.
THE WEST AND KALININ FRONTS
While the drive to the Dnieper raged in the south, the
Soviet forces on the Kalinin and West Fronts continued their
attacks as well. After failing to break through to Roslavl
and Smolensk during mid-August Yeremenko and Sokolovsky
prepared for a second round. On August 22nd STAVKA approved
a new plan which called for an attack on Yelnya rather then
Roslavl. Trubnikov's 10th Guards and Krylov's 21st Army
would spearhead the attack. On the Kalinin Front Yeremenko
brought up reserves and renewed his thrust for Smolensk. The
10th Guards and 21st Armies attacked the junction of the 4th
and 9th German Armies on the 28th. The German line broke at
the hinge and on August 31st Yelnya fell. Soviet troops were
across the northern Dnieper. Dorogobuzh fell on September
1st. The Germans fell back on a formidable defense line
built to protect Smolensk. Sokolovsky halted his attack to
consolidate his gains and to regroup for the next assault.
Yeremenko and Sokolovsky renewed the offensive toward
Smolensk on September 15th for the third and last time. The
right flank of the West Front was to cooperate with the
Kalinin Front to advance through Yartsevo. The center was to
head straight for Smolensk while the left flank advanced on
Roslavl and the Desna River. Yartsevo fell on the 16th. The
German defenders were overwhelmed and forced to retreat. The
Kalinin Front broke through the 3rd Panzer Army's right flank
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and liberated Demidov. This move further threatened the
flank of the German defensive positions. On September 25th
Smolensk fell to Soviet forces. By the first of October the
German forces had been driven back to a line running
north-south through Propoysk and Rudnya to Usvyaty. All that
stood between the Soviets and the Dnieper was a small German
bridgehead. Sokolovsky and Yeremenko began preparing for the
next phase of the operation.
THE PARTISAN FRONT
The partisans were particularly active during the drive
to the Dnieper phase of the Soviet campaign. The partisans
increased their activity in the behind the German 4th Army
and in the area of the 4th Panzer and 2nd Armies. Their
main mission included the destruction of enemy rail and
communications facilities and the gathering of intelligence.
After a lull early in September, the units need resupplied
with explosives, demolition activity increased behind AGC.
On the night of September 18th-19th 3,250 demolition charges
were set. This raid was followed by another on the night of
September 25th-26th when 4,240 charges were laid. Over half
of the attacks were successful. Twelve hundred and fifty six
raids produced 4,257 breaks in AGC ' s rail network. The
partisans destroyed or damaged 109 locomotives and 600
railway cars in the month of September in the AGC area
alone. As the Soviet army pushed westward the mission of
the partisans changed. They assisted the array in anyway
possible. In the area of Kazarovichi, 12 kilometers north of
Lutezh, partisans saved 300 fishing boats for Soviet
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troops. Although they caused considerable damage, the
German effort to supply their troops and execute withdrawals
was not seriously hampered. The partisan effort did divert
German troops to anti-partisan duty, thereby preventing them
from serving in the frontline.
CHAPTER VII
PHASE THREE: THE BATTLE FOR THE BRIDGEHEADS
By the end of September the Soviet army had reached the
German defenses along the Molochnaya River, seized numerous
bridgeheads along the Dnieper, and in the north had liberated
Smolensk. The Germans held a bridgehead on the left bank of
the Dnieper from Vitebsk to Mogilev in the north and a small
bridgehead around Zaporozhe in the south.
The Soviet forces regrouped during the first week of
October. In recognition of the new military situation the
High command reorganized and renamed the military Fronts.
The Kalinin Front became the First Baltic Front. The West
Front remained the same. The Bryansk and Central Fronts
became the Belorussian Front. The Voronezh, Steppe,
Southwest, and Southern became the First, Second, Third, and
119Fourth Ukrainian Fronts respectively. With their
objective, bridgeheads across the Dnieper, in sight the High
Command quickly formulated a plan of attack.
The First Baltic, West, and Belorussian Fronts were to
destroy the German bridgehead east of the Dnieper in the
Vitebsk - Mogilev - Gomel area. To break the tough German
defenses, STAVKA intended to outflank the German positions.
To accomplish this, the First Baltic Front was to attack in
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the Nevel area, while the Belorussian Front attacked in the
Gomel area. The West Front was to maintain pressure on the
center of the German bridgehead. To the south the 1st
Ukrainian Front was to attack in the direction of Kiev
liberating the city and expanding the Bridgeheads in their
sector. The Second and Third Ukrainian Fronts were to attack
southwest in the direction of Kirovograd and Krivoi Rog.
They were to destroy the German bridgehead at Zaporozhe and
to enlarge the Soviet bridgeheads on the right bank. The
Fourth Ukrainian Front was to break the German Molochnaya
River line and liberate the lower reaches of the Dnieper
River. Its primary mission was the capture of Perekop and
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the entrapment of the Axis units in the Crimea.
THE FOURTH UKRAINIAN FRONT
General Tolbukhin's Fourth Ukrainian Front renewed his
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offensive against the German 6th Army on October 9th. The
2nd Guards, 5th Shock and 44th Armies attacked north of
Melitopol in the direction of Mikhaylov. The 28th Army
attacked south of Melitopol while the 51st Army waited in
reserve ready to exploit a breakthrough. After heavy
fighting the 28th Army reached the outskirts of Melitopol and
crossed the Molochnaya establishing a bridgehead. Tolbukhin
altered his operational plan and transferred the 51st Army
and 19th Tank Corps south. The 51st Army fought for two
weeks to capture Melitopol. The city fell on October 23rd.
89
The next day the 19th Tank Corps blasted through the last
German defenses and headed west. The 6th Army began
retreating once more. By November 5th Tolbukhin's forces
controlled the lower reaches of the Dnieper and had cut off
the Axis forces in the Crimea. The only German forces east
of the Dnieper were in bridgeheads around Kherson and
Nikopol. The Nikopol bridgehead represented a major obstacle
because of its heavy fortifications. Hitler was determined
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to maintain control of the vital nickel mines in the area.
THE SECOND AND THIRD UKRAINIAN FRONTS
On the Second and Third Ukrainian Fronts Konev and
Malinovsky expanded the bridgeheads on the west bank. They
intended to drive west toward Krivoi Rog to threaten the
German forces in the Zaporozhe and Dnepropetrovsk area with
encirclement. The 5th Guards and 37th Armies were to provide
the breakthrough and while the 5th Guards Tank Army stood
ready to exploit. In conjunction with Konev' s attack
Malinovsky' s troops were to liberate Zaporozhe and eliminate
the German bridgehead on the east bank of the Dnieper.
On October 10th the 3rd Guards and 8th Guards Armies
assaulted the heavily fortified positions at Zaporozhe. Even
though the attack was proceeded by a massive artillery
barrage the attack failed. The Germans held, but the costs
were high. General von Mackensen, the German commander
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reported that he would have to retreat because he could no
longer man a continuous line. 123 On October 13th Malinovsky
launched a night assault against Zaporozhe with the 8th
Guards Army, 1st Guards Mechanized Corps, and the 23rd Tank
Corps. The 12th Army attacked north of the city while the
3rd Guards hit to the south. The attack unhinged the German
defenders and they withdrew from the city after blowing
city's dam and railway bridges. On the 14th the remaining
Germans in the Zaporozhe bridgehead were eliminated. Konev
and Malinovsky launched their drive on Krivoi Rog the next
day. The 5th Guards Tank Army entered the battle in the
afternoon, and the advance gained momentum. The main problem
facing the attacking units was the terrible conditions of the
roads. By the 23rd Soviet units were on the outskirts of
Krivoi Rog.
While Konev' s troops moved forward Malinovsky took
advantage of the situation to eliminate the enemy units in
the Dnepropetrovsk area. He hoped to trap the Germans in
Dnepropetrovsk with a double envelopment, the 46th Army from
the north and the 8th Guards from the south. The attack
began on the 23rd and on the 25th Dnepropetrovsk fell to
Soviet troops, but not before the Germans destroyed the
Dneprodzerzhinsk Hydroelectric dam. On Konev' s Front the
advance continued as the 18th Tank Corps entered Krivoi Rog
on the 24th. Unfortunately for the tank corps its infantry
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support, the 3 7th Army, was stopped by a German counter
attack. On evening the 18th Tank Corps had to retreat for
lack of fuel and ammunition. By the end of October Konev
and Malinovsky had joined their original bridgeheads into a
single position over 150 kilometers wide and up to a 100
kilometers deep.
His drive toward Krivoi Rog blunted Konev switched the
main emphasis of his attack to the Cherkassy area. On
November 13th the 52nd Army broke through the German 8th Army
defenses and threatened Cherkassy with encirclement. Konev
sent the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 53rd Army north along
the west bank of the Dnieper. The Germans 8th Army, unable
to stop Konev's forces, gave ground slowly. The 1st Panzer
Army and 6th Army were under pressure to the south and could
not spare any units. On the 14th of November Konev renewed
his attack on Krivoi Rog, but the autumn mud had arrived with
full force and the attack bogged down. Mobility did not
return to the battlefield until mid-December when the ground
finally froze. By the end of December Konev and Malinovsky
had a large bridgehead from Cherkassy in the north to
Zaporozhe in the south, a distance of over three hundred
kilometers. 125 Soviet forces were firmly established on the
west bank.
THE FIRST UKRAINIAN FRONT
In the meantime Vatutin on the First Ukrainian Front
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expanded the bridgeheads around Kiev. Ordered to liberate
Kiev, his plan called for an attack from the Bukrin bend
supported by a secondary strike from the Lutezh bridgehead
north of Kiev. The 40th, 27th, and 3rd Guards Tank Armies
were to break through the German defenses in the Bukrin Bend
and proceed northwest bypassing Kiev to the south. The
secondary attack by the 3 8th Army and 5th Guards Tank Corps
would head south bypassing Kiev to the Northwest. The
attack, executed on October 12th, failed to break the German
positions in the Bukrin area. To the north the 38th Army
expanded its bridgehead and came within artillery range of
Kiev. From the 21st to 23rd of October the 40th and 27th
Armies tried to breakout again but failed. On October 24th
STAVKA accepted an October 18th proposal to shift the main
avenue of attack from the Bukrin area to the Lutezh
•. j 126bridgehead.
Vatutin planned to break out of the Lutezh bridgehead by
massing the 38th, 60th, 3rd Guards Tank Armies, the 1st
Guards Cavalry Corps and the 7th Breakthrough Artillery
Corps. The breakthrough frontage was six kilometers which
made it possible to mass 320 guns and mortars per kilometer
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of attack frontage. On the main avenue of attack the
assault forces were to have a 3 to 1 advantage in infantry,
12 8
4.5 to 1 in artillery and 9 to 1 in tanks. After the
artillery barrage the 38th Army was to breach the
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German defenses while the 3rd Guards Tank Army and 1st Guards
Cavalry Corps waited to exploit the breakthrough. To cover
the main breakout secondary attacks were planned. The 60th
Army would attack north from the Lutezh bridgehead and the
40th and 27th Armies would attack from the Bukrin bridgehead
two days before the main attack. After breaking out the
assault forces were to destroy the 4th Panzer Army and
liberate Kiev. Then the First Ukrainian Front was to roll
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west toward Zhitomir and Korosten. The plan was
relatively simple but required a great deal of skill to
implement.
The most difficult task facing Vatutin was the movement
of the 3rd Guards Tank Army, VII Breakthrough Artillery
Corps, XXIII Rifle Corps and numerous other support units
from the Bukrin Bend area to the Lutezh bridgehead. Front
Deputy commander Colonel-General A. Grechko was in charge of
the move. The task of moving the units was monstrous. In
seven days the troops had to move anywhere from one hundred
and thirty to two hundred kilometers and had to make three
river crossings, the Dnieper twice and Desna once. The
column of the 7th Artillery Corps extended seventy
kilometers. To move all the guns, the unit's transports made
several trips. In addition to the several hundred tanks,
hundreds of guns, and thousands of men moved into the
bridgehead, thousands of tons of supplies were also moved.
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Elaborate measure were taken to conceal the movement. The
troops were moved only at night and during the heavy mist of
early morning and evening. Radio traffic in the Bukrin Bend
was maintained at the normal level. Camouflage was used at
both bridgeheads. In the Bukrin Bend, dummy tanks and
artillery were constructed and in the Lutezh bridgehead the
arriving troops were carefully dispersed and the eguipment
hidden. The entire move was completed before the end
of
October.
On November 1st the 40th and 27th Armies began their
attack on the German defenses in the Bukrin Bend. After a
forty minute artillery barrage the infantry went forward,
throwing itself at the German defense.
132 To the North
Vatutin finalized his attack preparations. While his units
attacked to the south, reconnaissance units began probing the
defenses around the Lutezh bridgehead. The German defense
consisted of fortified positions connected by trenches, wire
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obstacles, and minefields.
On November 3rd the 38th Army attacked. Following in
the wake of an intense artillery and air bombardment the 38th
Army made surprisingly good progress. By the end of the day
Soviet Units had advanced seven to twelve kilometers and were
nearly through the German defense Zone. The Germans,
considering Vatutin' s strike just another attempt to expand
the bridgehead, reacted rather slowly. The 20th
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Panzergrenadier and two reserve Panzer divisions were ordered
north, and airstrikes were ordered against the attacking
Soviet columns. The Soviet troops continued to advance on
November 4th. The roads were nearly impassable because of
the autumn mud, but the 3rd Guards Tank Army was committed
during the afternoon.
The situation on the German front did not appear serious
until late on November 4th when the 3rd Guards Tank Army
launched a surprise night attack. The Germans broke and ran.
By the morning of the 5th Soviet armored forces had cut the
Kiev-Zhitomir railroad and were advancing southward. The 1st
Guards Cavalry was headed west toward Zhitomir. Late on the
5th, units of the 38th Army reached the outskirts of Kiev.
The German situation deteriorated rapidly as the Soviet
breakthrough grew. In Kiev the German defenders and support
personnel began retreating as the threat of encirclement
increased. On November 6th units of the 38th Army liberated
Kiev. The Soviet forces fanned out to the expand the
bridgehead. The 3rd Guards Tank and 38th Armies went south
and southwest. The 60th and 13th Armies advanced north and
northwest.
Desperate to contain the breakthrough, von Manstein
launched heavy counter attacks on November 8th against
Tripole and Fastov. The counterattacks stopped the southward
advance of 3 8th Army. To the west the advance continued. On
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the 12th the 3rd Guards Tank Army liberated Zhitomir, on the
17th the 60th Army took Korosten, on the 18th the 13th Army
took Ovruch to the northwest. By mid-November the Kiev
bridgehead extended from Chernobyl to the north of Kiev to
Chernyakhov, Zhitomir, Fastov and then to Tripole on the
Dnieper south of Kiev. The bridgehead was over five hundred
135kilometers wide and one hundred and fifty kilometers deep.
The loss of Zhitomir, Korosten, and Fastov hindered
German rail movement between AGC and AGS. To counter the
Soviet advances, to reopen the vital rail lines, and to
eliminate the Soviet bridgehead, von Manstein launched a
counterattack with fifteen divisions including seven Panzer
and Panzergrenadier divisions. The German counterattack
recaptured Zhitomir on the 19th, Korosten on the 24th and
pushed the Soviet forces to the east. Determined not to lose
their hard won gains, STAVKA ordered Vatutin to halt his
offensive on the center and left flank. The 13th and 60th
Armies on the right continued to advance. The Germans
attempted to advance up the Kiev highway but were
unsuccessful. On November 25th von Manstein halted the
German counterattack because of the worsening weather. On
November 28th the 1st Guards Army crossed the Dnieper and
took up positions between the 38th and 60th Armies. In
mid-December the ground froze sufficiently to hold tanks and
the Germans renewed their counter-offensive against the Kiev
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bridgehead. The German attacks continued until December 21st
with limited success. The Soviet Bridgehead at Kiev held off
the German attacks. Vatutin succeeded in his mission. He
established a secure bridgehead across the Dnieper, liberated
Kiev, and destroyed a large part of the 4th Panzer Army.
THE FIRST BALTIC, WEST, AND BELORUSSIAN FRONTS
To the north the First Baltic, West, and Belorussian
Fronts continued the offensive in October. Rokossovsky
attacked on the axis Zhlobin-Dobruisk-Minsk. Sokolovsky's
West Front tried to liberate Orsha and advance on Mogilev
while Yeremenko's First Baltic Front moved on Vitebsk. The
objective of the three thrusts was to eliminate the German
bridgehead east of the Dnieper. The German salient extended
from Loyev in the south to east of Orsha and measured 300
kilometers in length and at its widest point was 60
137kilometers deep.
The First Baltic Front attacked on October 6th. The
43rd and 39th Armies launched a secondary attack while the
3rd and 4th Shock Armies attacked Nevel. The German line
crumbled and Nevel fell on the first day of the attack. Von
Kluge reacted quickly but lacked the necessary forces to
dislodge the Soviet troops from Nevel. After a disastrous
attack on October 8th, the German troops paused to await
reinforcements. Fortunately for von Kluge, Yeremenko chose
to slow his offensive while he reassessed the situation. The
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Germans used the break to shore up the breakthrough. On
October 15th Yeremenko attacked northeast and achieved only
minor results. Following five days of reconnaissance in
force yeremenko launched a major assault southwest of Nevel.
The 3rd and 4th Shock Armies created a 16 kilometer gap in
13 8
enemy positions and fanned out behind the German lines.
The 3rd Shock Army turned north behind the German 16th Army
and the 4th Shock Army turned southwest behind the 3rd Panzer
Army. The two shock armies were reinforced by the 6th and
11th Guards Armies. Throughout November the Germans
attempted to seal the breakthrough and contain the Soviet
forces but were unsuccessful. By November 23rd the 4th Shock
Army was only 5 kilometers from Gorodok, an important rail
1 3 9
and road junction. The drive was finally halted by the
weather during the last week of November. An unseasonal thaw
turned the battlefield into mud and brought both sides to a
halt.
The ground finally refroze during the second week of
December and the Soviet forces renewed their drive on
Vitebsk. The 11th Guards Army assaulted the 3rd Panzer Army
on December 13th. Attacked from three sides, two divisions
of the 3rd Panzer Army were quickly surrounded and only
managed to breakout three days later with their light
equipment. On December 23rd the 4th Shock, 11th Guards,
39th, and 43rd Armies attacked the German positions around
Vitebsk, but the German line held.
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While Yeremenko dealt with the northern flank of Array
Group Center, Rokossovsky attacked to the south. Throughout
the first week of October the German 4th Panzer and 2nd Army
attempted to eliminate the Soviet bridgehead at the mouth of
the Pripet River. German forces captured Chernobyl but were
unable to dislodge the Soviet forces from their 50 kilometer
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wide and 8 kilometer deep bridgehead.
While the German forces were engaged in the south
Rokossovsky attacked north and south of Gomel to destroy the
German bridgehead east of the Sozh River. The attack began
October 7th and failed to make any major gains. On October
15th Rokossovsky launched his major offensive against a 30
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kilometer section of the German line south of Gomel. With
the German forces engaged north and south of the breakthrough
area the attacking units succeeded in breaking through. The
Germans sent a Panzer division to seal off the breakthrough
but were only moderately successful. The Soviet force was
halted but not pushed back. Rokossovsky halted the operation
on the 22nd and began consolidating his new 100 kilometer
wide and 8 kilometer deep bridgehead. The next day the
63rd Army renewed its attack north of Gomel. On the 28th
Rokossovsky renewed his attack from the Loyev bridgehead
south of Gomel. The German 2nd and 9th Armies, stretched to
the limit, managed to hold once again. On October 31st
Rokossovsky halted the Loyev offensive once more.
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Rokossovsky tried for the third time on November
10th to
breakout from the Loyev bridgehead. The German
line held on
the first day but finally gave way on the
11th. The German
2nd Army, under attack from the First Ukrainian
Front in the
south, could not move reserves to the center.
On November
13th Soviet units were west of Retchitsa.
The Germans
launched a last gasp attack to close the gap in
their lines
but failed. Rokossovsky • units fanned out
and headed west.
On November 23rd the rail line from Kalinkovichi
to Zhlobin
was cut. To the north Rokossovsky ' s 50th
Army attacked
Propoysk on the 22nd threatening to breakthrough
the northern
flank of the German 9th Army. Gomel fell
on November 26th.
As on the First Baltic Front the thaw during
the last week of
November stopped the Soviet advance and gave
the Germans time
to regroup and attempt the formation of a
new line. By the
end of November the German 2nd Army was in
position east of
the Pripet and by December 5th the 9th Army
had fallen back
and straightened its line.
The Soviet forces continued the attack in
mid-December
when mobility returned to the battlefield.
Soviet units
moved west of Kobylshchina. Reinforced with
a new Panzer
division sent from Italy the Germans
launched a
counterattack. On the 20th the 2nd and 9th Army
linked up at
Kobylshchina and pushed the Soviets east of the city.
After
four more days of combat the German units
cleared the railway
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north of the city but were unable to dislodge the Soviets
from the Ipa River. On December 26th the Germans called off
the attack.
While Yeremenko and Rokossovsky hit both flanks of Army
Group Center, Sokolovsky's West Front attacked the center .
The German 4th Army, dug in in front of Orsha, held very
formidable positions. Aided by large swamps and many minor
rivers, the Germans took advantage of the favorable terrain
and repelled each Soviet assault in turn. In two and half
months, from October to the middle of December, Sokolovsky
launched four unsuccessful assaults on the Orsha sector.
Although unsuccessful the attacks did tie down German units
which were needed on the flanks of Army Group Center.
CHAPTER VIII
ANALYSIS
The campaign in the summer and autumn of 1943
demonstrated the growing capabilities and skill of the Soviet
military. Through sound operational planning, organization,
and proper execution the military achieved a victory of
unprecedented scale. In 1943 the Soviet offensive doctrine,
established in the 1936 Field Regulations, became reality.
The five month campaign consisted of a series of successive
operations along a 2,000 kilometer front. In these
operations the Soviet forces emphasized, deep operations, the
penetration of enemy positions through their entire tactical
depth. The attacking Soviet forces advanced 300-600
144kilometers along the entire front. Finally the use of
combined-arms formations made it all possible. These new
armies gave the Soviet forces the necessary power and speed
to break through the enemy positions and achieve deep
operations
.
The Soviet High Command and Front organizations
demonstrated their growing skill from the very beginning of
the 1943 campaign. When faced with the choice of launching a
preemptive attack or going over to the strategic defense, the
High Command made an sound decision. After examining the
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available intelligence data, such as information from the
Lucy spy ring, the High Command recognized the dangers of a
preemptive strike and decided to dig in, concentrate their
forces, and await the expected German offensive. The High
Command tailored their plans to fit the reality of the time.
A preemptive strike, such as the one launched in the spring
of 1942, would have given the Germans an important if not
decisive advantage. The Germans based their defense on
mobility, and maneuver on the battlefield. Soviet mechanized
units still lacked the experience and skill to defeat the
Germans in a meeting engagement on open ground. The adoption
of a deliberate defensive posture gave the Soviets a distinct
advantage. Soviet infantrymen were at their best when dug in
while the German units, preferring maneuver, disliked taking
fortified positions by direct assault.
After absorbing the German offensive effort, the High
Command decided to return to the offensive with the ultimate
objective of liberating the eastern Ukraine and establishing
bridgeheads on the west bank of the Dnieper. The decision to
assume a deliberate defense followed by offensive operations
demonstrated their growing confidence in their own abilities
and equipment. The summer campaign brought to light many
strengths and weaknesses of the armed forces. The strengths
led to victory, efforts were quickly made to correct the
weaknesses
.
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During the Battle of Kursk, the Soviet forces achieved
two major goals. First, they stopped the German offensive
short of its objective. Second, the German reserves so
carefully built up during the spring of 1943 were destroyed.
The Soviet forces were able to stop the Germans by negating
the enemy's advantage, maneuverability. By constructing some
of the most formidable defenses ever seen, concentrating all
available forces, and carefully coordinating the units
involved, the High Command was able to deal with the German
forces. Although von Manstein argues that victory was within
his grasp when Hitler cancelled Operation Citadel, his claim
has little basis. The Soviet forces facing von Manstein were
depleted following the Battle at Prokhorovka, but so were the
Germans. Whereas von Manstein had very few reserves, mainly
the 24th Panzer Corps, the Soviets had the 27th and 53rd
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Armies in position north of Prokhorovka. The German
formations violated their own armored doctrine at Kursk and
paid dearly for the attempt. They gave up mobility. Rather
then fight a battle of maneuver, the German mechanized forces
tried to break through fixed positions. During the defensive
phase of the Kursk battle the Soviet forces succeeded in
maximizing their strengths and the Germans' weaknesses.
The Soviet performance during Operation Kutuzov was far
from perfect. The operation is significant for several
reasons. First, the breakthrough operation conducted by the
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11th Guards Army typified the Soviet method of breaching
enemy defensive lines. Proceeded by intense reconnaissance
activity, the main attack began with a massive artillery
barrage and air assault. As the barrage lifted the infantry
and tanks moved forward. Supported by artillery and aircraft
through the first defense zone the 11th Guards Army quickly
broke through the entire depth of the German position. After
the 11th Guards Army achieved the breakthrough the West
Front's lack of mechanized forces limited the Soviet gains.
The most serious problem encountered during the Orel
operation was the failure of the tank armies to achieve the
desired results. The 3rd Guards Tank Army attempted to fight
a meeting engagement with a Panzer formation southeast of
Orel and suffered very heavy losses. When the 4th Tank Army
assaulted the German fortifications around Bolkhov it failed
miserably. The failure of the two tank armies pointed out
the need for combined-arms forces. The failure to properly
utilize the tank forces led to reform and more emphasis on
armor doctrine. Despite the failures of Soviet armor.
Operation Kutuzov succeeded and the Germans were pushed
westward.
The Soviet performance record improved with Operation
Rurnyantsev
. Marshal Zhukov improved the coordination of
artillery and airpower. He worked with the commanders of the
armored formations and emphasized their proper utilization.
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The breakthrough forces, equipped with large numbers of
tanks, quickly opened a hole in the German line south of
Kursk. The 1st and 5th Guards Tank Armies performed much
better then their counterparts to the north. The tank armies
did not attempt to deal with German fortifications. Once the
breakthrough forces had penetrated through the first German
defense zone, the tank armies rolled forward. Once through,
the mechanized forces quickly split the 4th Panzer Army into
several pieces and defeated several German counterattacks.
For Operation Rumyantsev Zhukov stressed speed,
concentration, surprise and timing. 4 °
The drive to the Dnieper demonstrated the skill of the
Soviet leadership even further. By concentrating their
forces at strategic points they were able to break open the
entire front. The Germans, their reserves committed or
destroyed during the Battle of Kursk, were unable to defend
the entire front and lacked the necessary mobile units to
establish an effective mobile defense. The German forces
suffered heavy losses in their attempt to reach the safety of
the Dnieper. The Soviet doctrine of successive operations
put pressure on the German line in many areas which forced
the Germans to be everywhere at once. As the Soviet forces
reached the Dnieper they crossed on the march and established
twenty-three bridgeheads by the end of September. To reach
the Dnieper the Soviet army staged successive operations in
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which breakthrough forces penetrated through the entire
tactical depth of the German positions. This allowed the
second echelon, the mobile formations, to penetrate through
the operational depth of the German formations.
During the drive to the Dnieper the armored forces were
pulled out of the line, refitted and rested. Not until
mid-September did they return. The 3rd Guards Tank Army
quickly reached the Dnieper and became one of the first units
to gain a foothold on the west bank of the river. The High
Command quickly made efforts to solidify the bridgehead in
the Bukrin area. To block German forces moving toward the
bridgehead airborne units were used. This use of airborne
forces was another example of the PU-36 Field regulations
put into practice Even though the operation failed, it does
demonstrate the High Command's desire to use all available
forces to implement their offensive doctrine
During the Battle of the Bridgeheads the Soviet forces
continued to surprise the Germans. After repeated attempts
to break out of the Bukrin bridgehead the High Command
authorized a daring move to shift the axis of the attack.
Under cover of darkness the 3rd Guards Tank Army and other
support units pulled out of the Bukrin area and moved north
to the Lutezh bridgehead. The move, a major organizational
feat, was accomplished without detection. On November 3rd
the forces in Lutezh bridgehead attacked and quickly achieved
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a major breakthrough. By using a daring night assault the
Soviet tanks were able to reach open ground and fan out
behind the German lines. The Soviet forces liberated Kiev
and established a large bridgehead around Kiev. Breakthrough
tactics combined with armored exploitation succeeded in
breaking the German lines.
The Soviet military succeeded during the summer and
autumn of 1943 for several reason. First, their
organization, molded by two years of war, fit their
capabilities and doctrine. Second, the production of war
materials reached a level which enabled the massing of
artillery, tanks, and aircraft. The ccncentration of
offensive weapons was key to the Soviet offensive doctrine.
Third, the officers and men of the Soviet army were becoming
professional soldiers, not just fighters. Although the
Germans had overcome the numerically superior Soviet forces
in 1941 by outsmarting them, they were unable to do so in
1943. In 1943 everything came together for the Soviet
military. The combined-arms forces, adhering to the basic
principles of operational art , made it possible to implement
the offer.sive doctrine developed during the 193 Vs. This
doctrine emphasized successive operations and deep
operations
.
CONCLUSION
The Soviet summer - autumn campaign of 1943 was a major
victory, a victory which marked a permanent change of
initiative on the Eastern Front. More importantly it was a
classic example of Soviet operational thinking. At Kursk the
Soviets defeated the elite of the German Panzer forces.
After stopping the German offensive, the Soviet combined-arms
forces began offensive operations and liberated Orel and
Kharkov. The drive to the Dnieper commenced and the Germans
were driven behind the river. After fierce fighting the
Soviet bridgeheads were expanded and the German "East Wall"
fell. The German position in the Western Ukraine became
precarious
.
The armed forces of the Soviet Union defeated a skillful
and resourceful German Army. They defeated talented men such
as von Manstein, Hoth, and Kempf. They defeated the Germans
with breakthrough and exploitation tactics based on a system
of echeloning and cooperation between combat arms. The
coordinated effort of infantry, armor, artillery, and
airpower concentrated at a decisive point repeatedly broke
the German lines. The second echelon, mechanized units,
moved forward and widened the breach. The resulting
breakthrough allowed the entire front to push forward. The
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exploiting units advanced in an attempt to capture subsequent
enemy lines off the march. The Soviet offensive consisted of
a series of leapfrog maneuvers, breakthrough and
exploitation.
The idea that the Soviet Army was only able to defeat
the German forces by sheer weight of numbers overlooks
several important points. First, the upper level Soviet
officers, such as Zhukov, Konev, Vasilevsky, Tolbukhin and
Yeremenko, were competent and by 1943 they had experience.
The majority of these men were graduates of the Frunze
Military Academy. Most graduated in the mid-1930 's at the
very time the Soviet offensive doctrine was being formulated.
The growth of an experienced Soviet officer corps equipped
with a doctrine for using the growing inventory of equipment
threatened the German Army more then any number of tanks ever
would. Second, the Soviet Army had developed a sophisticated
doctrine emphasizing breakthrough tactics, exploitation and
deep operations.
When studying the Soviet military, whether its military
thought or its present organization, it is important not to
neglect the Soviet past. The Soviet military goes to great
lengths to learn from its historical experience. The
majority of articles in the Soviet Military History Journal
carry headings such as "Soviet Military Art in the Great
Patriotic War," and "Lessons of the Great Patriotic War". If
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western scholars and military personnel are to gain an
understanding of the Soviet way of war they must take a fresh
look at the Soviet World War II experience. A new look is
required because most studies of the war on the Eastern Front
are distorted, colored by western concepts of warfare. It is
easy to use a German scale when measuring the military skill
of the Soviet Army in World War II, but the results are far
from accurate. When analyizing Soviet military operations,
they should be judged against Soviet standards of success and
failure.
The Battle of Kursk and the drive to the Dnieper
reveals that, contrary to a popular misconception, the Soviet
Army in World War II was more than the proverbial
"steamroller". The Soviet military defeated the Germans with
skilled commanders, good equipment, a sound operational
doctrine, and an aggressive attitude toward war. The Soviet
forces developed a sophisticated approach to war. The
Soviets molded their armed forces to fit the terrain,
traditions, and capabilities of the Soviet Union. Soviet
historians have been drawing lessons from their World War II
experience for years. Western historians would do well to
follow suit.
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ABSTRACT
The study of warfare on the Eastern Front during World
War Two has for the most part suffered from two major
weaknesses. First, most works rely on German sources and
interpretations of the Russo-German experience. Second, the
effect of this reliance has led to a distorted view of Soviet
military accomplishments. The German emphasis on tactics as
a means to implement strategy masks the most important aspect
of Soviet military operations during the war, Operational
thinking. The Soviet recognition of operational art as an
intermediate level between strategy and tactics represents a
major advance in military thinking.
Soviet operational art emphasized mobility,
concentration, and surprise. The successful application of
these principles enabled the Soviet military to implement its
doctrine of successive thrusts, deep operations, and
combined-arms warfare. The "offensive" typified the Soviet
way of war. Skilled commanders, good equipment, a sound
operational doctrine, and a military tradition that stressed
aggressiveness made the Soviet "offensive" possible.
This study examines Soviet military operations in the
latter half of 1943. The Battle of Kursk and the drive to
the Dnieper are good examples of Soviet operational planning
and practice. After halting the German assault forces at
Kursk with a deliberately defensive posture the Soviet forces
launched a series of counterattacks. The initial Soviet
operations culminated in the liberation of Orel and Kharkov.
The drive to the Dnieper commenced and the German forces were
driven behind the river. The Soviet forces advanced along a
2,000 kilometer front, penetrating the German defenses to a
depth of 300 to 600 kilometers. During the Battle for the
Bridgeheads Kiev was liberated and a firm foothold gained on
the west bank of the Dnieper River. Through the use of
successive thrusts, deep operations, and combined arms
formations the Soviet forces defeated the German forces.
